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This report is an attempt to review the feasibility and the 
applicability of privatization to two Government-owned public 
bodies, namely the Airport Authority (AA) and the Mass Transit 
Railway Corporation (MTRC). 
Substantial effort has been made to perform an extensive and 
comprehensive search on recent privatization cases, which 
happened not only in Hong Kong and China, but also other parts of 
the world. Selected cases are being studied in detail so as to 
develop a framework for evaluation. 
An interesting finding is that while both AA and MTRC are wholly-
owned by the Government and engaged in development and 
management of large scale infrastructural projects, they are at 
different stages of development, characterized by different 
corporate culture, funding needs, and operate under different 
external environments, etc.. 
iv 
It is considered that AA and MTRC new extensions (such as Tseung 
Kwan 0 and the Kennedy Town Extension) are potential candidates 
for privatization while the Operating Railway (i.e. the existing 
domestic lines) and the new Lantau and Airport Railway of MTRC 
are not. 
Recommendations regarding the best way forward, in both short-
term and long-term, will be discussed. 
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Privatization has been a widespread phenomenon since 1980s. 
Airport and railway privatization, in particular, are becoming more 
and more popular nowadays. Recent examples are cited in Appendix 
1 and 5. 
For the first time in its history, Hong Kong is carrying out the 
construction of ten Airport Core Projects at a total estimated cost of 
HK$ 1 58 billion. The scale is so large and business opportunity is so 
enormous that Hong Kong has become a centre of attraction of the 
world. 
Two of the Airport Core Projects are the new airport at Chek Lap 
Kok and the new Lantau and Airport Railway. They will be 
developed and managed respectively by AA and MTRC. 
2 
Besides, MTRC is also planning other new infrastructural projects 
such as the Tseung Kwan 0 and Kennedy Town Extension. 
The two companies share some common attributes. They are both 
100%-owned by the Hong Kong Government, has no immediate 
funding need for the projects and faces little market competition 
locally. Both of them are characterized by their heavy commitment, 
immobility, and the need to continue project development after the 
handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. 
A visionary management should consider, at an early stage, what 
measures should be adopted in order to survive and prosper under 
the new and dynamic environment. It is the intention of this paper 
to assess whether privatization is an appropriate step that the 





A literature review will first be conducted to examine the various 
modes and definitions of "privatization." The motives, objectives, 
pros and cons and objections against privatization will also be 
summarized. 
Several cases will then be studied in greater detail in an attempt to 
identify the pitfalls and critical success factors for privatization. 
These include local cases (the Hospital Authority and the Kowloon-
Canton Railway Corporation), overseas cases (British Airport 
Authority, Albany County Airport, British Rail, Thailand Metro, 
Boston's World Trade Center Monorail and the Orlando Maglev 
Demonstration Project, etc.) and most importantly, recent cases in 
China (Guangzhou Metro, Beijing Metro and Wuhan Metro). 
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Situational analyses will then be performed against these factors to 
assess whether those favorable conditions exist in AA and MTRC. 
Finally, recommendations will be given as to whether the Hong 
Kong Government should privatize the airport, the Operating 
Railway and the Lantau and Airport Railway, or the new railway 




Modes and Definitions 
The issue of "privatization" has been extensively discussed in 
various literature. The term "privatization" may refer to:-
• the formation of a Companies Act company and subsequent sale 
of at least 50% of its shares to private shareholders; ^  
• the sale of an existing state-owned enterprise; ^ 
• the use of private financing and management for new 
infrastructure development^ e.g. Build-Operate-Transfer BOT; 
• outsourcing of public services;^ 
1 M.E. Beesley, Privatizations, regulation and deregulation (Routledge, 1992), p.1 - 23. 
2 Gomez - Jose A. Ibanez, John R. Meyer, Going Private - The International Experience 
wi th Transport Privatisation (Washington D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 1. 
3 lbanez and Meyer (1993), p.1. 
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• deregulation,® 
• franchising,® (i.e. confer the right to supply or distribute goods 
and services to a sole producer or operator for a specified period); 
or 
• management buy-out/ 
While taking various forms, they all strive to increase the 
participation of the private sector and promote competition. 
To a certain extent, therefore, one might regard the Hong Kong 
Government has already "privatized" the Airport Authority (AA) and 
the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) because they are not 
part of the Government. In principle, they should carry out their 
designated duties in accordance with prudent commercial principles. 
However, since both companies are 100%-owned by the Hong 
Kong Government, the influence of the latter is substantial. It is 
worthwhile to consider whether the companies should be 
4 lbanez and Meyer (1993), p.1. 
5 Mat thew Bishop, John Kay and Colin Kayer, Privatization and Economic Performance 
(Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 342 - 345. 
6 Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994), p. 1 - 15. 
7 Bishop, Kay and Kayer {1994), p. 314 - 317. 
7 
"further privatized" so that the real, genuine and effective control 
are transferred to the hands of the private sector. 
8 
Motives and Objectives 
Numerous empirical studies revealed that private sector out-
performed the public sector. Public companies seldom react to 
marketing development and are prepared to operate their business at 
a loss. Over-staffing is also common. A World Bank study by Feibel 
and Walters (1980) for example, showed that in some cities, the 
cost of private bus service is approximately 50% to 60% that of 
publicly owned companies.® 
Privatization of UK companies such as British Telecom, Post Office, 
BAA, British Rail, British Coal and British Gas, etc. saw increase in 
profit, sales and share price since privatization. The "total factor 
productivity," which measures the relation between physical inputs 
/ 
and output, increased at an average annual rate of about 1 % to over 
7%. Judging on economic grounds, privatization has worked 
perfectly. ® 
8 Gabriel Roth, Private Provision of Public Services in Developing Countries (Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 221. 
g John Kay, Colin Mayer and David Thompson, Privatisation & Regulation - the UK 
Experience (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), p. 94 - 99. 
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Ruling out the assumption that people in the public sector are less 
capable than their counterparts in the private sector, the 
phenomenon might be explained by the following:-
• Public firms are bounded by bureaucratic public sector rules.^° 
• Public firms are funded by public money. As such, they are 
accountable to the public, making them unable to resist political 
pressures to provide unremunerative services." 
• There is a lack of incentive to improve performance and 
efficiency.i2 
• There is no threat of being taken-over or going bankrupt because 
the Government is providing the full backingJ^ 
• Job security is usually high. Sacking based on poor performance 
is seldom executed. Employees are "guaranteed" a comfortable 
life even without much contribution. 
/ 
Improving efficiency so that goods and services can be delivered at 
the lowest costs is therefore one of the major motives for 
governments to privatize public enterprises. 
1° Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986), p. 101 - 145. 
” Roth (1987), p. 220. 
12 Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986), p. 101 - 145. 
13 Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994), p. 15 - 32. 
10 
Other privatisation objectives cited by Beesley (1992), lbanez and 
Meyer (1993) and Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994) include:- ^^' ^'' ®^ 
• To allow diversification and redeployment of assets so that 
company will not be constrained by nationalization status. 
• To free company from uneconomic services. 
• To improve quality of service and encourage innovation so that 
customers will be better served and only the goods and services 
desired and wanted will be produced. 
• To obtain immediate financial gain. 
• To tape new sources of funds, (e.g. To finance infrastructure 
without substantial increase in tax.) 
• To reduce public borrowing. 
• To reduce government involvement in decision making of the 
enterprise. 
14 Beesley {1992), p. 23 - 40. 
15 lbanez and Meyer (1993), p.3, 4, 275. 
17 Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994), p. 337 - 353. 
11 
• To ease problems of public sector pay determination. 
• To widen share ownership. 
• To motivate employees by giving them freedom of action, 
instituting employee share ownership scheme, and linking pay to 
performance, etc.. 
• To gain political advantages. (A very good example is the 
persistent pursue for privatization of the non-profitable British Rail 
by the Conservative Party despite public pressure. Their primary 
motive is to show that they have put in a lot of efforts to get rid 
of the burden for tax payer regardless of whether the public really 
benefit from the move.) 
y 
12 
The Issue Of Ownership 
The transfer of ownership to private sector is believed to be one of 
the cures to the problems of public enterprises and thus bring about 
the desirable outcome. 
Some scholars argued that it is competition, not ownership per se, 
that matters. Simon Domberger and John Piggott, for example, cited 
international evidence to support that even without the transfer of 
ownership, deregulation or liberalization of market will generate 
substantial improvement if a public enterprise operates in a highly 
protected or regulated environment. Kay and Thompson (1986) also 
stated that liberalization without ownership transfer generates 
substantial improvements in productive efficiency. Borcherding 
blamed the lack of competition as the reason for less efficient 
production of public f i r m s . ” 
Nevertheless, private ownership facilitates changes in corporate 
culture and thus achievement of the objectives. 
Parker and Hartley for example, concluded that organizational 
change was associated with improvements in labour productivity 
17 Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994), p. 337 - 353. 
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growth. The greater the shift towards private ownership, the greater 
the improvement will be. 
Mike Wright, Steve Thompson and Ken Robbie also held the same 
opinion. They stated that flotation of public enterprise is often 
associated with 
• a clear specification of the profit objective; 
• the introduction of bankruptcy threat; 
• the transfer of monitoring from political process to the stock 
market; and 
• the potential for improved managerial incentives. 
They further found that in the USA and UK, significant positive 
effects, at least in short to medium term, are indicated.^® 
The issue of ownership is best summarized by Barry Gibson, the 
Group Retail Director of the British Airport Authority (BAA):-
"Privatization acted like a catalyst, allowing BAA to dump old 
management practices and experiment with new ones. New 
revenue channels such as retailing could then be fully 
exploited. ... BAA was privatized in 1987, that began the 
17 Bishop, Kay and Kayer (1994), p. 337 - 353. 
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cultural change ... When you join the private sector you need 
to start satisfying shareholders, ^^  
Yet citing examples of Schiphol and Singapore Changi Airport, he 
went on clarifying that privatization is not a necessary step. 
"There is no fundamental philosophical reason why private 
ownership will make it (provision of high quality product) 
happen.“ 
19 Airport Business Management & Development. September, 1 995, pp. 31. 
15 
Objections 
The main objection for privatization lies in externalities. Private 
companies, motivated only by their own interests, for example, may 
not deal responsibly with the environment. Safety is also a concern. 
The firm is also unlikely to render services which are socially 
preferred but financially not viable.^° 
It was also argued that a private firm which operates in an 
uncompetitive or unregulated environment will also be inefficient 
and holds back on the quality and quantity of services produced. 
Equity is also a problem as privatization usually involves re-
distribution of welfare and thus creates winners and losers. 
Lastly, it was cited that other alternatives are available for achieving 
some objectives of privatization. For example, by issuing bonds, the 
public firm can also tap private capital without increasing tax or 
private capital. 
While these may be valid arguments, some are not supported by 
empirical findings. For example, a World Bank study by Feibel and 
2° lbanez and Meyer (1993), p. 286 - 288. 
16 
Walters (1980) on private bus companies in a number of cities 
(including Bangkok and Istanbul) : found little concrete evidence to 
support the conventional allegation that private services are less 
safe than public ones, nor do private operators "skim the cream" by 
serving only the most profitable routes. 
The potential negative effects of privatization can be reduced by 
imposing regulatory control and/or liberalization simultaneously. The 
following cases provide some illustrations. 
21 Roth (1987), p. 221. 
17 
Case Study 
British Airport Authority 
Background 
British Airport Authority (BAA) was a Government-owned 
corporation established in 1965 to operate Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Preswick airports. In the 1970s, Edinburgh, Aberdeen 
and Glasgow were also transferred to BAA. 
In an attempt to reduce the size of public sector and promote 
innovative management, the British Government introduced a white 
paper in 1 985 on airport policy to propose the privatization of BAA. 
An Airports Act was finally passed in 1 986 and shares of BAA were 
traded freely in the stock exchange in July 1 987. 
18 
Control 
Vigorous controls and regulations were stipulated in the Airports Act 
1 986 to prevent unreasonable conduct by the airport operator. For 
example:-
• Price control for Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted were 
implemented. BAA can only increase aeronautical charges 
(aircraft landing or parking fees, passenger handling charge) at a 
rate of RPI - X, where RPI is the Retail Price Index and X is the 
expected increase in productivity specified below:-
^ Y ^ X (%) 
87 - 91/92 1 
92/93 - 93/94 8 
94/95 4 
95/96 - 96/97 1 
• Commercial services is not subject to this formula but the 
Monopolies and Merge Commission and the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) would review the commercial policies every 5 
19 
years and could request changes. The next formula setting 
exercise for 1997 - 2002 has started at the end of 1 995. 
• BAA is also required to produce more detailed accounts than is 
normally required under Companies Acts and present revenues 
and expenditures in a detailed and transparent manner. 
• There can be no change of use for airport land without 
Government approval. 
• Government reserves the right to take over airports in case of war 
or other national crisis. 
• CAA can investigate complaints of discrimination or abuse of 
dominant position. 
• Government may also limit the size of any individual shareholding 
(15%) to prevent takeover battles and instability. 
• The Government, through various departments, continues to 
regulate aviation safety, aircraft noise and environmental impacts, 
and control air space and major expansions. 
Result 
With only about a 60% increase in passenger traffic from 55.3 
million in 1 987 to 87.7 million in 1 995, revenue for the same period 
increased 1.64 folds from GBP 439 million to GBP 1159 million. 
20 
Earnings per share also increased 2.5 folds from 7.8p to 27.3p, 
representing an impressive average annual increase of 1 7%.^^ 
BAA is among the top 40 companies in the UK on current market 
capitalization and enjoys strong credit rating (Short-term rating is 
A1 + by Standard and Poor's and B1 by Moodys. Long-term debt is 
rated AA- and A1 by the two companies respectively). As at 22 
May 1995, the largest group of shareholder is pension funds (30% 
of the issued capital), followed by other corporate holders (24%), 
insurance companies (18%) and private individuals ( 1 7 % ) ? 
BAA has also been very customer-oriented. It carries out extensive 
market research and annual survey (Quality Service Monitor) to 
gauge the performance of each airport with respect to 7 areas 
(cleanliness, mechanical assistance, procedures, comfort, 
congestion, BAA staff, value for money). A Worldwide Value 
Guarantee program was launched in May 1994 under which 
customers are promised full refund from any where in the world if 
they are not satisfied with any product bought at any BAA's airport. 
There is also a 24-hour freephone helpline for passengers to check 
whether an item is in stock and to reserve or pre-order. 
22 British Airport Authority, BAA Report and Accounts. 1995. p. 51. 
23 British Airport Authority, BAA Report and Accounts. 1995, p. 52. 
21 
The company diversifies into other non-aeronautical activities such 
as retail to maximize its revenue. In the year ended 31 March 1995, 
retail revenue represented 44% BAA's total revenue.^^ 
A pro-active and aggressive attitude towards meeting future 
demand is observed. A fifth terminal, for example, is currently under 
planning to increase capacity of Heathrow by 30 million passengers 
by 2002. Heathrow Express, the rail link into central London, is due 
to open in 1 998.^^ The company's ordinary shares are now listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the 
Australian Stock E x c h a n g e ? 
Problem 
The most serious problem encountered was the over-aggressive 
pursuit of profit by BAA. In order to increase profit, the company 
used every means to increase revenue in early years including, for 
example, charging taxi, bus and coach operators a fee for picking up 
airline passengers. This drew growing criticism from the public and 
24 British Airport Authority, BAA Report and Accounts. 1995, p. 3. 
25 "BAA gets ready to bid in Australian sale," Airport Forum. 6/1995, pp. 9 - 10. 
26 British Airport Authority, BAA Report and Accounts. 1995, p. 51. 
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the press, and resulted in the sudden and unexpected sacking of the 
Chief Executive in August 1 989. 
Since then, a moderate approach has been adopted. For example, a 
"down-town pricing" policy has been implemented to ensure that 
merchandise sold at the airport will not be sold at a price higher 
than comparable downtown outlets. The policy stimulated demand 
and resulted in great leap in retail sales, and BAA is continually 
renovating and expanding the retail areas in its airports. 
Lesson 
Government's determination and support is critical to the success 
and failure of a privatization. 
Problems are bound to occur especially when competition is limited. 
A comprehensive regulatory plan is necessary but not sufficient. It is 
a responsive Government, which monitors closely the development, 
listens to the public's view and acts accordingly, that ultimately 
makes the plan a success. 
Full airport privatization is no longer a dream. 
23 
The Albany County Airport 
Background 
Almost all major airports in the US are owned and operated by 
regional governments. Facing a cutback in federal aid and a cost 
overrun, the Albany County proposed to privatize the airport in the 
late 1980s in order to obtain immediate financial gain (and to 
modernize the airport). 
An initial bid of US$4 million was proposed by a regional public 
agency which operated the public bus system. Several months later, 
a private real estate firm, British American, which controlled 400 
acres of land adjacent to the airport, teamed up with Lockheed Air 
Terminal, offered to buy the airport for US$30 million. A series of 
negotiation and revision of offer began. At the end, there were two 
attractive proposals ready for selection. 
Airlines and other aviation groups, however, voiced their concern for 
higher fees after privatization and lobbied actively. The Federal 
Aviation Administration finally objected both proposals in December 
1 989 fearing that the proceed would constitute transfer of airport 
24 
revenue to off-airport purposes and potential monopoly abuse. The 
plan to sell / lease the airport was finally abandoned in late 1 990. 
Lesson 
This case again, illustrates the importance of government and social 
support, and the need for a well-thought regulatory plan. 
Profitability, although helpful, does not guarantee successful 
privatization. 
Had the County drawn up some control measures to ensure that 
public interests, including those of the airlines, would not be 
undermined, the Federal Government might not need to reject both 
proposals. 
25 
Los Angeles Airport 
Another very similar case is the proposed privatization of the Los 
Angeles Airport (LAX). 
Background 
Citing the poor financial performance of LAX against BAA, the 
newly elected Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan proposed to lease 
or sell LAX to private business and use the proceeds to put more 
cops on the street in 1991. To show his determination to bring 
down cost of the Government and improve its effectiveness, he 
even announced that he would take only US$1 a year in salary, 
saving the city US1 6,999!^^ 
His privatization plan was first objected by the 15-member city 
council, the majority of which was not convinced that public asset 
should be in private hands. Then it was the powerful airlines 
association Air Transport Association, which feared that a more 
business-like airport management would demand tougher terms from 
airlines using the facilities. Airlines also conducted their lobbying in 
27 "Status quo, please," Forbes, 11 October, 1993, pp. 70- 71. 
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Washington and obtained support from the head of the 
transportation appropriations subcommittee, who warned that if 
Riordan kept pushing for the plan, he would do what he could to 
stop Riordan from getting federal money needed for other 
projects.28 
Notwithstanding the pressure, Riordan met Bill Clinton and the 
Secretary of Transportation personally in July 1993 to ask for a 
grant to allow Los Angeles to divert airport funds. What he received 
was just a polite but noncommittal answer. 
Lesson 
/ The LAX and the previous Albany County Airport cases demonstrate 
clearly the social and political aspects of privatization. Because of 
the large number of parties involved, maintenance of a balanced 
interests is crucial. 
The top-down approach, like the BAA case, is often more effective 
and acceptable than bottom-up. The reason may be the government 
is in a better position to conduct extensive consultation with various 
27 "Status quo, please," Forbes, 11 October, 1993, pp. 70- 71. 
27 
parties, and to develop the most impartial control scheme and 
implementation plan. 
28 
British Rail Privatization 
Background 
The privatization bill for British Rail (BR) was passed in 1993. The 
Transport Secretary aimed to have the first series of franchise 
available to private buyers in 1994. 
Since late 1995, BR has been hiving-off 70 businesses with a 
turnover of GBP 2 billion. To effect the privatization process, the 
railway was divided into a number of franchisable routes and 
services providers. Sales of franchise ranged from heavy repair 
workshop, maintenance activities, rail line to quarry. 
The primary objective was to sell-off the assets to private sector 
instead of building a new system to introduce competitions. 
29 
The Control 
Many shadow franchises were established to take over the original 
BR business prior to franchising.^^ They include "Railtrack" - a 
company currently wholly owned by Government, together with its 
subsidiaries, "ROSCCT - three rolling stock leasing companies and 
twenty five "TOC" passenger train operating companies, which take 
over the operation of the businesses operated by the British Rail. 
The shadow franchises are intended to operate for a reasonable 
period of time before they are sold. The purpose is to provide a set 
of accounts for potential private buyers for evaluation, and to allow 
the companies to demonstrate their capability to offer safe and 
punctual services. 
Normally, contracts will be awarded to those private operators who 
can provide decent services with the lowest level of subsidy. 
29 British Rail Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, Passenger Rail Industry Overview. 
September, 1995, p. 16-36. 
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The first six franchises were awarded in 1995, and the government 
plans have been half way through in April 1 996 when the general 
election will be at most a year away.^° 
Process 
The "Railtrack" has been created to own BR's track and signalling 
system and vice versa for other shadow franchises. This partial 
reorganization before privatization improves marketing and 
efficiency. Seminars were held on privatization with financial 
institutions which need more concrete information before they can 
commit their investors' cash. 
However, there is strong pressure from the public that Railtrack 
should not be sold until satisfactory safety management systems 
are in place to ensure proper co-ordination among the newly formed 
companies. 
3° "Rail privatization - Late Departure," The Economist. March, 1994, pp.67. 
31 
Result 
The award of the franchise was inevitably delayed. By 1995, only 
two franchises were awarded. 
In December 1 995, the first franchise of passenger train fleet South 
West was sold at GBP 1.8 billion. The second of the 25 franchises, 
Great Western Trains franchise, which runs train services from 
London to Southwest England, was awarded to the 3i Group PI at 
GBP 5.6 billion for seven years.^^ 3i also holds a 24.5% stake. The 
remaining 51% is held by Great Western management and 
employees. 
Within the same month, a consortium led by Wisconsin Central 
Transportation Corporation bought 3 freight-train companies from 
BR for GBP 225 million. The group also bought Rail Express 
Systems, a unit of BR, in December 95 for GBP 39.6 million.^^ 
The latest plan of the Government is to sell at least 51 % of 
Railtrack by April 1996. 
31 "FirstBus wins Train franchise," South China Morning Post. 21 December 1995. 
32 "British Rail sells freight divisions," South China Morning Post. 26 February 1996. 
32 
Well before the sale of Railtrack, the "Safety Case", a document 
that demonstrates the existence of an effective Safety Management 
System to oversee the franchisee's operation, was submitted by 
Railtrack. It was subsequently endorsed by Health and Safety 
Executive in March 1994.33 Getting the Safety Case approved is a 
pre-requisite for obtaining a licence. 
33 "Is Railtrack safe enough to sell," • , April, 1995, p.6-7. 
33 
Problems 
The BR privatization creates privatized monopoly which is still a 
monopoly. It does not offer the economic gains generated by 
competition, and prohibits the introduction of healthy competition 
into the business. 
The rush to privatization in the last 2 years caused services to get 
worse before they get better. The anticipated service improvement 
objectives were not achieved within the short period of time. 
The Government's plan to sell the state-owned rail service has been 
criticized by the public and the main opposition Labour Party, who 
prosecuted privatization may lead to worse service, higher ticket 
prices and public financing. This might be wrongly used as a 
political tool by the anti-privatization Labour Party. 
Fraud easily develops during the privatization process and letting of 
franchisees. Britain's transport secretary said he was delaying the 
scheduled privatization of London, Tilbury and Southend (LTS) Rail 
while allegations of fraud were i n v e s t i g a t e d ? In addition, an 
unnamed director of the consortium, who was suspected to be 
34 "Brit ish Rail sells freight div is ions/ ' South China Morning Post. Feb. 26, 1996. 
34 
involved in a serious breach of ticket revenue settlement 
arrangements in buying LTS Rail, resigned on 3 February 1996. 
Lessons 
A major barrier to competition in the railway industry is its large 
unavoidable fixed costs of production. This makes the introduction 
of competition infeasible. The fixed costs for the structure, rolling 
stock, trackwork, power supply and administration are high. 
Average cost will decrease with increase in train services, but 
retrained by the passenger demand and train service capacity. 
It is thus not feasible nor financially viable for the private sector to 
build new railways to compete with BR. That is also why British 
Government decided that a single railway firm or "natural 
monopolies" will still be efficient enough to fulfill market demand 
even without the introduction of competition. 
A sound legal framework, safety management system, and audit 
and control procedures for leasing franchises must be in place in 
order to avoid fraud, chaos and unfair decisions. 
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Other Railway Privatization Examples in Europe 
Railways in Europe are shifting from bureaucratic, integrated, 
national monoliths into commercially-oriented, customer-focused 
service providers as a result of p r i v a t i z a t i o n ? 
The underlying forces for change are mainly due to three main 
issues. Firstly, there is rapid change of rail technology. The need to 
make significant investment in new track is reduced. Secondly, 
"deregulation" by EU directives requires railways to separate 
infrastructure from services. Thirdly, transport demand in Europe is 
growing rapidly. Road and air transports are increasingly congested. 
Rail is an attractive alternative. 
Gradually, railway transport in Europe is moving from a vertically 
integrated single enterprise to distinct segments like aviation, and is 
performed by separate private entities in order to be efficient and 
commercially viable. Like the BR's example, the single railway is 
segregated into infrastructures - stations, track, signalling, service 
providers, owners of rolling stock and equipment manufacturer. 
35 "The commercial rail revolution starts rolling in Europe," The Public Transport Report 
1995 /96 . p. 4 0 - 41. 
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Typical examples are the Sweden Railway, Channel Tunnel and the 
Paris Metros. (Please refer to Appendix 5 for a summary of the 
cases of privatization.) 
However, not all the privatization cases are successful. The Channel 
Tunnel 's case tells us that government subsidy for large scale 
project is inevitable. The Swiss Railway case reveals that 
privatization is not necessary for railways that are operating 
efficiently. 
37 
Railway Development and Operational Strategies in China 
Before looking at the specific case of MTRC, it is worthwhile to 
scrutinize and analyze the latest trend of infrastructural projects' 
development in China, in particular the rail industry. The latest 
financing arrangements of new projects and the existing influence of 
government on transport development, operations and maintenance 
will be evaluated in details. 
Background 
China's railroads are heavily utilized. In 1986, the railroad carried 1 
billion passengers and 1.3 billion tons of cargo. The average freight 
traffic density was 1 5 million tons per route-kilometer, double that 
of the United States and three times that of I n d i a , 
The railroads in China were owned by the state and controlled by 
the Ministry of Railways. In 1986, a contract system for the 
management of railroad lines was introduced in China. Five-year 
contracts were signed between the ministry and individual railroad 
36 "Army Area Handbook Chapter 8 .03: Transportat ion," U.S.Department of Army. 
1994. p.3. 
38 
bureaus that were given the individual responsibility for profits and 
losses. Transportation was brought up as a top priority in the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) with an aim to increase the 
volume of transportation by 30 % by 1990. 
To achieve these goals, the Government planned to increase state 
and local investment as well as to use private funds.^^ 
Recent developments 
According to the Chinese Minister of Railways, in 1994, the new 
construction and double-tracking totaled to 3346 km, the highest 
record in China's railway industry. In October 1995, an ambitious 
15-year development programme was announced, the railway 
development will be accelerated to expand the network, upgrade the 
railway equipment and improve the safety and services of the 
railway.38 
37 "Army Area Handbook Chapter 8.03: Transportation," U.S.Department of Army. 
1994. p.5 
38 "Construction Programme surges a h e a d . Railway Gazette International. December 
1995, p.83-87. 
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In order to sustain the growth of economy, China is investing 
US$36 billion on refurbishment before 2000. It has an aggressive 
plan to add about 8,000 km of new railway lines to its existing 
network by the end of this decade, bringing the total trackwork to 
over 67,500 km. ' ' 
The most ambitious of the developments is the high speed line 
linking Beijing and Hong Kong, 2536 km to the south at a cost of 
40 billion yuan (about HK$36.8 b i l l i o n ) . * � I t signifies China's priority 
over linking up with the southern economic regions especially Hong 
Kong. It worths mentioning that the Chinese Railway Ministry has 
awarded the signalling and automation contract of the Beijing-
Kowloon Railway to Italy's Ansaldo Transporti and more contracts 
to other overseas contractors. 
The first phase of the second line of Shanghai underway railway 
system requires an investment of US$1.2 billion. It is likely to be 
awarded to a German Consortium, who built line one of the city's 
metro system/^ The Chinese Government has tried to find the bid 
from US, Japan and Germany to get the best financing and 
39 "Railways need US$36b revamp," South China Morning Post. Jan. 11, 1996. 
4° "Beijing-HK Rail Project," South China Morning Post. Jan. 12, 1996. 
41 "Germans tipped to land rail deal," South China Morning Post. Dec. 5, 1995. 
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technology transfers. Similar to other recent railway developments, 
half of the fund will come from a mixture of government and 
commercially financed loans. 
Means to attract foreign investments 
In 1 994, railway system reported losses of seven billion yuan for 
railway freight. In the recent years, the Ministry of Railways is 
adopting a more open policy to increase its revenue by inviting more 
foreign investment. The following are a summary of the various 
measures that were undertaken to raise fund from the private 
sectors: 
1. In August 1995, the Wuhan Railway bureau was 
experimenting with a capitalist way of making a fast buck - by 
selling naming rights on trains.^^ Auction was arranged to bid 
for the naming rights of 10 trains for a year. Interested parties 
from ail nationalities participated. However, advertisements 
would have to comply with China's advertising law, and this 
meant no depiction of ammunition, arms or cigarettes. Public 
42 "Railway to sell naming rights to advertisers," South China Morning Post. Aug. 23, 
1995. 
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tendering has become an innovative method of selling 
intangible assets in China. 
2. In September 1995, China announced that it will issue bonds 
abroad, list some railway companies abroad and establish 
railway investment funds.^^ The Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway 
has been selected for listing in Hong Kong and will float by the 
first quarter of 1996. The China's most profitable Railway had 
submitted an application to the Hong Kong Exchange, and also 
sought a dual listing in the United States through an issue of 
depository receipts. The company under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Railways, had picked Bear Stearns as sponsor and 
co-ordinating with HG Asia and China Development Finance. 
3. In December 1995, China issued 1.53 billion yuan in bonds to 
finance the construction of 11 major railway projects/^ 
Agreement was signed between the Ministry of Railways and 
the China Securities Co.. Three-year bonds, carrying a face 
value of 1 yuan and 15 per cent interest rate were issued. 
43 "Mainland Enterprises pursue HK Listings," South China Morning Post. Sep. 11, 
1995. 
44 "Rail bond issue planned," South China Morning Post. Dec. 21, 1995. 
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This is the second time to raise construction bond after the 2 
billion yuan worth of bonds was raised in 1992. 
4. In December 1995, the Dailian railway administration has 
become the first bureau of its kind to be recognized as a legal 
entity.45 The new Dailian Railway Co. was formed which 
marked the beginning of market-oriented management of 
railway industry. The state-owned company controls 543.5 
km of railway lines, with an annual handling capacity of 25 
million passengers and 30 million tones of cargo. 
Fare Policy 
The fare policy of Chinese Government on locally run metros can be 
reflected from the recent Beijing Metro fare rise event. 
The Beijing subway is a 43-km network which carries 8.3 million 
passengers per week. However, the Beijing subway is still losing 
money in 1 996 due to its low fare. The average running cost per 
journey is 2.7 yuan compared to the revised fare of 2 yuan/® which 
has been raised four times compared to the previous fare of 0.5 
45 "Legal Status f irst," South China Morning Post, Dec. 21, 1995. 
46 "Beijing subway fares quadruple," South China Morning Post. Jan. 2, 1996. 
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yuan. The manner in which the fare was increased reflects the 
conflict between the needs of the market and fear of China's leader 
on anger of the public and a rise in inflation. This was only the third 
price increase since the subway operated in 1 971 and the central 
Government refused two applications by the subway company and 
the city government to raise the fare to match with rising costs due 
to inflation. The city government in 1995 paid a subsidy of 400 
million yuans, up from 250 million in 1 994. A third line into the east 
suburbs which costs 4 billion yuans was postponed due to shortage 
of fund. 
Lesson 
With regard to the fare policy, the facts above suggest that the 
China Government has the final power on railroad or metro fare 
price increase over the local government or the company, based on 
its own economic policy or other reasons. For the time being, the 
fare revenue in most China railways is not able to finance the 
operations of the railway nor to sustain the development of new 
extensions. This is quite alarming if the same principle or fare 
control policy were applied to Hong Kong Railway Systems after 
1997. 
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However, it should be noted there are regional appeal centres in the 
Southeast Asia region that could handle contract disputes between 
company and the government. In the case of MTRC, these 
establishments can safeguard the rights of the Corporation given in 
the MTRC Ordinance to determine the fare adjustment without the 
need for seeking approval from the Government. 
On the optimistic side, it is evident that China is undergoing massive 
efforts to upgrade and expand its railway network.^^ In addition, 
China is becoming more open in attracting and inviting foreign 
investment in its infrastructural projects to meet with the huge fund 
required. This is a clear signal for more liberalized utilities operations 
and privatization of nationalized industries. 
47 "Construction Programme surges ahead". Railway Gazette International. December, 1995. 
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Privatization and Private Financing Examples in China 
The central government in Beijing has made privatization one of its 
principal policy objectives for 1995, but the initial implementation of 
that policy has been hampered by the struggle to succeed Deng. 
There is no clear rule at present and if the process goes too far, it 
might be frozen.^® 
State-owned enterprise 
Overseas Chinese Businessman Oei Hong Leong, bought 55 percent 
of the formerly state-owned firm in Jan. 1 994 which is an evidence 
that China is going capitalist ®^. Oei's Hong Kong-listed China 
Strategic Holdings has taken majority control of nearly 200 factories 
previously owned by local or provincial governments. 
China's new Company Law, enacted in July 1994, seems to commit 
the government to the path of privatization and appears committed 
to corporatizing at least a significant portion of its state-owned 
enterprises. An established legal framework now exists to facilitate 
48 "Buying up Oei Hong," Institutional Investor. Jan., 1995, pp.46-54 
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this process, and a substantial number of these corporatized state-
owned enterprises seem targeting the equity markets in China or 
abroad. 
InfrastructuraI Development 
China is carefully hedged under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
method. The main objective of introducing BOT in its infrastructural 
projects is to attract foreign firms to put up initial funding and runs 
project for a specified period until costs are recouped or an agreed 
profit m a d e . 
Subsequently, the project is handed over to the Chinese 
Government "without any compensation." The Project companies 
shoulder all risks during the leased period. As a sweetener, foreign 
investors would be permitted to increase charges for use of the 
project in case substantial losses occur due to "readjustment of 
China's policies. In return, project companies are also allowed to 
remit foreign exchange to repay loans or dividends. 
49 "Traps in BOT's rules of t h u m b . South China Morning Post. Dec. 8, 1995. 
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The typical private financing examples of metros and railways in 
China are summarized as follows.^® Most of them belong to well 
developed China cities like the Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and they 
will be the typical blueprints for future railway and metro links 
financing in Hong Kong. 
Guangzhou Metro 
The Line I of the Guangzhou Metro is under construction and 
planned to open in 1998-1999. It is a 14-km urban railway that 
runs through the centre of Guangzhou. The line's eastern terminus 
will be Guangzhou East Station on the Guangzhou-Shenzhen 
Railway line. 
The Guangzhou Metro is managed by the Guangzhou Metro 
Corporation (GMC),i a state-owned enterprise founded in December 
1992. The GMC was commissioned to carry out the construction 
and management of fast public transit systems of Guangzhou which 
include the Metro systems and LRT system, and the property 
development and management along the metro lines. 
50 Janes World Railways. 1995-1996. (Newyork : Franklin Watts), p. 32, 377. 
51 Yunping Shao, "The Newly-started and Promising Guangzhou Metro System," Transdelta 
Conference 1995, Guangzhou Metro Corporation, 1995, p. 56 - 59. 
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The financing of the Metro Line 1 follows the BOT Model. The 
project is wholly invested, built and operated by the foreign investor, 
on condition that they transfer it to the Municipal Government for 
management after a certain period together with land lease of a 
certain term and at a premium. 
Among the 25 plots of land for co-operative development, 17 
contracts have been signed. 
Shenzhen Metro 
An urban railway has been proposed for Shenzhen City, an airport 
link connecting the Shenzhen Railway Station with Huangtian 
Airport. The Shenzhen Planning Department has undertaken a 
Railway Development study in which three options for links with 
Hong Kong were explored:-
• a link crossing Deep Way to connect with Yuen Long and the 
planned Western Corridor Railway 
• a parallel alignment with the superhighway between Hong 
Kong and Huangtian Airport 
• a widening of the existing KCR crossing 
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Despite the above proposed links have no possible connections with 
the MTR network, but the KCR network instead, they illustrate the 
recognition of the strategic role of airport rail link in developing 
China cities. 
The operation patterns of similar metros in China will throw some 
light on how the existing Chinese Government intends the metros to 
be operated. 
Shanghai Metro 
The Shanghai Metro Corporation is responsible for operating the 
Shanghai Metro since the opening of Line 1 in 1 993. The route is 
16.1 km long with 13 stations. The fare structure is flat. A network 
of totaling 200 km has been approved for construction by 2010. 
The operating costs are 100% financed by fares? 
52 Janes World Railways. 1995-1996. (Newyork : Franklin Watts), p. 324. 
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Beijing Metro and Light Rail 
The Beijing Metro first line was opened in 1969 and had 840,000 
daily passengers in 1989. The Beijing Metro Corporation is 
responsible to the city government for both construction and 
operation of the metro ^^. 
In 1994, Beijing Municipal Engineering Administration signed a build-
operate-transfer contract with a California-based construction group 
for a 1 6.3-km line in the eastern suburbs to link with the Line 1 
metro. Another 38-km line will be constructed by a Joint Venture 
involving the Beijing Municipal Government and the Asian Pacific 
Rim Construction consortium in July 1 994; it will fund construction 
and operate the line for 20 years, after which ownership will pass to 
the Chinese Government. 
Shenzhen to Guangzhou Railway 
Investment banks are preparing for the floatation of China's 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway in April 1996, the largest HK 
53janes World Railways. 1995-1996. (Newyork : Franklin Watts), p. 32. 
51 
floatation by a Chinese enterprise since the listing of Maanshan Iron 
and Steel in 1 9 9 3 , 
The Company is seeking to raise about US$400 million in a dual 
listing in HK and US. The 50-km line is said to be most profitable in 
China under the Ministry of Railways. 
Lessons 
It is evident from the above that China has been experimenting 
widely with the build-operate-transfer method, involving overseas 
companies in its metro development, but is carefully hedged with 
restrictions. In addition, due to the remarkable growth in population 
and economic development of the cities, the most successful metro 
developments are associated with huge scale of property 
development. 
54 "Guangshen rail seeks US$400m." South China Morning Post. Mar. 5, 1996. 
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Private Financing Examples in Hong Kong - BOT 
Private financing through Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) of 
infrastructural projects has been successfully implemented in Hong 
Kong due to the lack of political interference and positive 
environment created by government, investors, contractors and 
engineers.55 
t 
The advantages of BOT are the ability to meet Hong Kong's 
immediate demands for infrastructure, incur no initial government 
expenditure and hedge the government against major risks. 
The mechanisms of BOT are briefly summarized as follows:-
• Projects considered commercially viable are let according to 
government policy on competitive tender basis. 
• Private sector is responsible for the management, design, 
construction and operation of the projects. 
• Revenue generated is used to operate the facility, repay 
interest and create profit for the sponsor in accordance with 
pre-established formulas for a fixed period, after which the 
55 Ian McKeat-Smitch, "Engineering aspects of BOT Hong Kong transportation," 
Transdelta Conference 1995. Charles Haswell & Partners (Far East) Ltd, p.194-199. 
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completed and tested facility will be transferred to public 
ownership. 
Major infrastructural projects in Hong Kong that are financed 
through the BOT schemes include:-
• Cross Harbour Tunnel 
• Eastern Harbour Crossing 
• Tate's Cairn Tunnel 
• Western Harbour Crossing 
• Route 3 Country Park 
The common attribute of BOT is that no government financing is 
/ 
involved. The private sector has to estimate the project financial 
viability by forecasting the traffic flows and competitive routes that 
will be built. All risks are therefore borne by investors and 
contractors. In return, Government contributes land required for 
construction and operation. For some cases, Government sponsors 
construction of adjacent supporting highways either directly or as 
entrusted works. 
The current BOT practice in Hong Kong is to grant a 30-year 
franchise from date of award which gives incentive to open facility 
as soon as possible. 
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The concept of BOT can be applied to new projects in which the 
government does not like to inject capital and those operations 
which are relatively routine and will be more economic to be 
operated by private sector. The application of BOT to MTR new 
extensions will be discussed in the latter chapter. 
- / 
55 
Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation 
Background 
Back in 1973, the Government appointed McKinsey and Co. Ltd. to 
commission a study on how the government can increase its 
capacity and expand the services it provides.^® One of the 
recommendations was to "hive-off" some departments so that they 
would function as separate agencies and be managed independently 
by their own Board and staff. The anticipated benefits include:-
• reduction of administrative load of the government; 
z • faster response to public needs; 
• flexibility to offer terms commensurate with the job; 
• less government control; and 
• more incentive to staff to improve performance. 
Potential candidates suggested include the airport, railway, 
waterworks and Post Office. It was against this background that the 
Executive Council decided to establish the Kowloon-Canton Railway 
Corporation (KCRC) on 15 September 1981. 
56 McKinsey and Co. Ltd., The machinery of Government : a framework for expanding 
services. 1973, p. 19. 
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Process and Problems 
A Transitional Board was established on 11 December 1981 to 
prepare the draft legislation, terms of employment and recommend 
appointment of the Chief Executive. Staff arrangement study was 
undertaken by Hay Management Group and an arbitrator was 
appointed to negotiation terms of transformation. There were three 
unions at that time. Because of the fear of loss of job security and 
promotion prospects, the rank and file staff almost strike during 
negotiation period.^^ 
Finally, a package was agreed where the salary of all staff will not 
be worse-off. "Ex-gratia disturbance allowance'' (equals 1 month 
every 3 years) were paid, and some fringe benefits (e.g. overseas 
education allowance) which were not provided by KCRC can be 
retained by staff currently enjoying them. 
A 3-month grace period was given and all department staff (1460) 
accepted the offer and were transferred to the new company. 
57 Emily Pik Yee Leung, Hiving-off: the case of KCRC. (M.Soc.Sc Dissertation, University 
of Hong Kong, 1989). 
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Results 
Great progress has been made since corporatization. Net profit 
before property development of the company increased from a loss 
of HK$65 million in 1984 to HK$705 in 1994. Revenue per 
employee increased almost 4 folds during the same period.^®'^ ^ 
The company had also adopted a pro-active approach in improving 
its services by, for example, establishing core values, passenger 
liaison groups and total quality management programs etc.. It was 
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one of the forerunners who implement the quality circles. 
To speed up decision making process, empowerment was 
encouraged. Line managers were given greater authority in, say, 
approving expenses. 
58 Kowloon Canton-Railway Corporation, Annual Report, 1990. p. 4 - 5. 
59 Kowloon Canton-Railway Corporation, Annual Report. 1994. p. 44 - 45. 
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Controversies 
The greatest controversy lies in fare increase. According to the 
KCRC Ordinance (Section 4), the Corporation is empowered to 
determine fare. Approval from the government is not required. There 
have been lots of critics regarding the lack of government control 
over the increase in fare. 
KCRC can also decide employment terms of its staff without 
consent of the government. The "golden handshake" in early 1 989 
which saw two senior employees given HK$4 million ex-gratia 
� payment drew much public attention. 
Lessons 
While the government has taken the first step to improve the 
railway service by de-bureaucratizing and reducing red tapes, 
adequate monitor and controlling measures were not in place. In 
view of the monopoly status of the company, some fare control 
scheme is required. 
The case also revealed the importance of appropriate staff transfer 
arrangement during implementation. After all, it is the employees 
59 
who contributed to the success of the company. How to maintain 





The need for a review in provision of medical service stemmed from 
the intense pressure of major government hospitals which resulted 
in overcrowding and long queues for t r e a t m e n t � A call for review 
was initiated in October 1983 by the Legislative Council. A 
management consultant, W.D. Scott Pty Co. was commissioned to 
study the management of existing public hospital system in 
February 1 985. 
_ / 
After reviewing the report, the Government decided to establish a 
Hospital Authority (HA), which should operate outside the civil 
service and have uniform employment terms. The Government will 
continue to fund the hospital service and determine the overall 
policy. The aim is to achieve "more effective management," "to 
keep abreast of improvements and innovations .. including modern 
management methods''. 
60 Sir S. Y. Chung, Report of the Provisional Hospital Authority. December, 1989, p. 2 -
3. 
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The Provisional Hospital Authority was established on 1 October 
1988. 
Process and Problems 
Similar to the case of KCRC, there was great concern over the 
change in remuneration package after the transfer. Consultants 
were employed to assist in design of the new terms of service. It 
was finally agreed that in principle, the new package should be a 
unified one, with total cost to the Government comparable to that 
of their counterparts in the civil service. It should be flexible, 
attractive and could be modified on an individual basis to attract the 
right person. 
A staggered implementation strategy was adopted for the existing 
34 public hospital over a period of three years. On 1 December 
1 990, HA was formally inaugurated. 
Result 
Since inception, the authority has adopted a customer and staff-
oriented management approach and introduced various innovative 
62 
measures. These include the focus group (started in March 1995), 
the patient feedback hot l ine , computerization of patient r e c o r d , 
semi-private wards, HA Card for staff (a credit card program 
organized jointly with Manhattan Card Co. Ltd.), psychiatric care 
service, reduction of accident and emergency patients waiting time 
to less than 30 m i n u t e s , and the recent employment of private 
doctors to cope with the demand during Christmas seasons. 
There were, however, critics regarding the extravagant pattern of 
spending public money, offer of luxurious bonus package, failure to 
handle staff shortage problems and lack of administrative co-
ordination, etc..64 
Lessons 
Again, labour relation is critical to the success of any organization 
reform. Yet short-sighted solutions should not be employed. Even 
today, 5 years after HA was established, the Director of Audit is 
61 Hospital Author i ty , Hospital Author i ty Newsletter. October 1995. 
62 Hospital Author i ty , Annual Plan. 95 - 96. 
63 Hospital Author i ty , Hospital Author i ty Newsletter. October 1994. 
64 Lowell S.H. Lai, The Corporatisation and Privatization of Medical Services in Hong 
Kong, {MPA Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1994), p. 95 - 97. 
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accusing HA staff for getting HK$6.7 billion more in housing 
benefits than their civil service counterparts over the next 20 y e a r . 
There were strong opposition from HA staff, especially the medical 
doctors, towards a reduction in housing benefits. 
- A realistic and well-thought implementation plan is important. The 
delay of setting up HA from the original target date of 1 April 1990 
66 to 1 December 1990 created uncertainties and adversely affected 
the credibility of the authority. 
Both KCRC and HA adopt an "user paid" principle. Yet unlike KCRC, 
HA is still being funded by the Government. Stringent monitoring is 
required to ensure that the public is not exploited and that tax 
payers' money is well-spent. 
65 "Anson Chan defiant on papers," South China Morning Post, Feb. 2, 1996. 
66 Sir S Y Chung, Report of the Provisional Hospital Authority. December, 1989, p. 132. 
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Critical Success Factors 
The previous cases should have shed some light on the far-reaching 
implication of privatization. As pointed out by Gomez (1993), 
privatization hinges on many political, social and economic 
concerns. It depends not only on efficiency improvements but 
societal concerns such as equity, income transfers, environmental 
problems and role of Government, etc.. 
To generalize the critical success factors for privatization is no easy 
task. Nevertheless, some "catalysts" can still be identified. 
Privatization will be enhanced if the following conditions prevail:-
1 • Economical ^^  
• Competition in the markets in which the privatized firms 
buy and sell. 
• Potential for large efficiency gain. 
• The activity can approximately cover its costs. 
• A stable economy with little investment risk. 
2. Social 68 
67 lbanez and Meyer (1993), p. 8 - 9. 
65 
• Staff welfare is not reduced. Adequate compensation is 
given. Positive perception of prospects under the new 
organization. 
• Not too many redistributions or transfers are involved. 
• Welfare of major players are not undermined. 
• There are fewer controversial consequences such as 
environmental concerns or economic development or 
growth. 
: ' 3. Political 
• Strong and continual government support. 
• A stable political environment. 







The Provisional Airport Authority was established in April 1 990 by 
the Hong Kong Government to plan, design and construct the new 
airport at Chek Lap Kok. It is 100%-owned by the Hong Kong 
Government. With the passage of the Airport Authority Bill in July 
1995, the Corporation was finally renamed the Airport Authority 
(AA) on 1 December 95, with the primary function to provide, 
operate, develop and maintain the new airport. 
The Land Grant further granted AA the entire Airport island 
comprising approximately 1248 hectares for the period up to 30 
June 2047 and the right to develop the island for airport 
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operational, support and related purpose including freight 
forwarders, hotels, offices retail and other commercial premises. 
According to the Agreed Minute On Financing for Airport and 
Airport Railway (4 November 1994), the Government is to inject 
HK$36.6 billion for the airport to build Phase 1 a of the project (See 
Appendix 2). Maximum borrowing shall not exceed HK$11.6 billion 
and AA shall be fully liable for the debt servicing. (It is expected 
that all borrowing for Phase 1 a will be fully repaid by the end of 
2 0 0 2 . ) 69 
Nevertheless, the Financial Support Agreement stipulates that the 
Government will provide additional equity to AA if, due to force 
majeure, the existing funds are inadequate to meet the costs of 
completing Phase 1 a. 




Being wholly owned by the Government, AA is in essence a "state-
owned" enterprise subject to all the potential problems discussed 
previously. Although it is legally charged with the liability to repay 
all the debts, it is ultimately the Hong Kong Government who is 
providing the backing. The company cannot be taken over or go 
bankrupt. There is little incentive to provide goods and services in 
an efficient and innovative manner, to satisfy customers needs or to 
maximize revenue. 
The use of public fund makes AA accountable to the public and puts 
it under tight scrutiny by various parties such as the Legislative 
Council, the Joint Liaison Group and the Airport Consultative 
Committee, etc.. A lot of time is spent on keeping various bodies 
updated and seeking approval. Public relation is also a must. A 
sizable corporate affairs team is required to handle all public 
requests, for example, for site visit and media interview, etc.. 
Regular publications are also required to keep the public informed 
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and maintain a good corporate image. All these, if not totally 
eliminated, at least can be cut down if the company is privatized. 
Job security is high. Like the Government, termination of 
employment due to unsatisfactory performance seldom happens in 
AA. Internal transfer is the method commonly used to accommodate 
those employees who were hired but later found to be not suitable 
for various reasons. Some departments, as a result, are unable to 
recruit the "best" candidates despite increase in head count. 
Number of staff grew rapidly from 745 in March 1 995 to over 1400 
by the end of the year. 
Corporate Structure 
Like most other organizations, AA has a functional structure. The 
company is departmentalized into divisions such as Commercial, 
Engineering, Human Resources, Finance and Information Technology 
and Legal, etc.. 
However, it is characterized by a high ratio of support staff vs. 
operational / line staff. The number of staff working under the 
Human Resources Department and the Administration Department, 
for example, is close to 60 each, representing more than 8% total 
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number of staff. The potential for streamlining the current 
establishment is obvious. 
Decision Making Process 
Internally, procedures for decision making are complicated and time-
consuming. A typical tender process, for example, consists of three 
stages, during each evaluation was carried out by three groups of 
panels, each made up of representatives from various departments 
of a certain rank. A quantitative approach is emphasized in 
,X 
evaluation. Each committee member has to assign points to each 
evaluation criterion, and the final score is determined via a 
complicated weighting system. 
Line managers are not empowered enough. Almost all decisions 
involve the Board, which is made up almost 50% by government 
officials (See Appendix 3). Getting a board paper approved normally 
requires 3 weeks, starting from registration. With the Board meeting 
held only once a month, the high degree of involvement of the 
Board in operational decisions and the lengthy approval process, 
efficiency, and sometimes also effectiveness, is jeopardized. 
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Human Resources Policy 
The intransparent human resources policy of the company is also a 
concern. Line managers are hiring new recruits without knowing the 
salary range they can offer. The Human Resources Department 
functions like a black box. Employees are not informed, via official 
channels, the pay scale, the remuneration system or how salary 
increase is tied to the annual performance appraisal. 
There is an urgent need to implement a fair and open 
reward/punishment system so that efficiency is uphold, a result-
oriented approach is encouraged, reward and punishment are tled to 
performance, and employees are clear of what they are expected 
and what they can expect to get. 
Potential for Efficiency Gain - Benchmarking 
In his recent publication "The Airport B u s i n e s s " , � R i g a s Doganis 
suggested various indicators to measure the productive efficiency of 
an airport from six different aspects:-
• overall cost performance 
7° Rigas Doganis, The Airport Business ,(Routledge London & NY, 1992). 
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• labour productivity 
• productivity of capital employed 
• revenue-generating performance 
• performance of commercial activities 
• overall profitability 
A broadbrush benchmarking of AA's performance based on pro 
forma financial statements and activity forecast against BAA, 
Denver, Copenhagen and Kai Tak airports is presented in Appendix 
4. 
I ‘ 
A more comprehensive comparison with other major international 
airports is not possible due to data availability. Most regional 
airports, as we shall discuss in the next section, were opened very 
recently. Again, lack of data is a constraint. 
Nevertheless, the selected airports resemble the new Hong Kong 
airport at Chek Lap Kok (CLK) in terms of volume of passenger 
traffic and/or their aggressive pursuit of revenue from airport retail 
activities, and thus could be considered as comparables. 
Raw data are first collected from various sources (Part A, Appendix 
4). Adjustments on period and unit of measurement are then made 
so that data are comparable (Part B). Seven performance indicators 
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are then calculated for each airport (Part C). Their relative ranks are 
presented in Part D and summarized in the table below. 
Indicator / Overall Cost Labour Productivity"~~~Productivity"^^ Revenue- Overall 
Rank Performance of capital generating profitability 
employed performance 
a b c d e f g 
1 Kai Tak Kai Tak Kai Tak Kai Tak Copenhagen BAA Kai Tak 
2 Denver Denver CLK ^TR Kai Tak C^K B ^ 
3 Copen. Copen. Copen. BAA Denver Copenhagen Copenhagen 
4 B ^ C[X B ^ Copen. BAA Kai Tak ^ER 
5 c i X BAA CUK Denver Denver 
a Total costs per WLU (HK$) b Operating costs per WLU (HK$) 
� c WLU per employee (thousand) d Total revenue per employee (HK$M) 
e WLU per GBP1000 net asset value f Total Revenue per WLU 
g Revenue to Expenditure Ratio 
CLK is found to perform well in terms of labour productivity and 
revenue-generating ability. However, its overall cost performance, 
overall profitability and productivity of capital employed ranked 
almost the lowest. 
While the result is mixed, one conclusion is clear. CLK performed 
much worse than Kai Tak in six out of the seven criteria (Total or 
operation costs per Work Load Unit, for example, is about 2.5 times 
more, while labour and capital productivity is only about 25 to 45% 
that of Kai Tak.) 
The room for further efficiency improvement is obvious. 
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Competition 
Although at the moment the Hong Kong International Airport at Kai 
Tak is facing no keen competition from any other airports, pressure 
is expected to build up at the time the new airport at CLK opens. 
In the Pearl River Delta alone, new airports at Macau, Zhuhai, 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou are ready to compete. 
I 
\ 
The Macau Airport, which was officially opened on 9 December 
1995, has a capacity of six million passenger a year/^ and is 
expected to draw about 15% traffic on the lucrative Hong Kong -
Taiwan route and some cargo from Hong Kong/^ Revenue to 
Cathay Pacific Airways on the Hong Kong to Taiwan routes is 
forecasted to drop by 5 to 10%/^ The airport can be accessed from 
Hong Kong by high speed ferry in 60 minutes and is linked to 
Guangzhou and other major cities in Guangdong by railway. An 
integrated system for passengers and cargo is also under 
development. Direct high-speed rail and motorway links to Zhuhai 
71 "Airport officials support a new and happy medium," Hong Kong Standard, Aug. 20, 1995. 
72 "Airport threat to terri tory," South China Morning Post, Dec. 12, 1995, p. 4. 
73 "Macau taps into Cathay cash-cow," South China Morning Post, Dec. 1, 1995. 
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and Guangzhou are being planned/^ Besides, its landing fees are 
1 5% lower than Hong Kong, and similar to Hong Kong, the airport is 
offered not only as a final destination but also as a stop-over for 
regional and inter-continental flights/5 
The Shenzhen Airport, which started operation on 12 October 
1991, can be easily accessed by ferry and bus from Hong Kong. 
There are also other sea and land transportation means to Zhuhai, 
Shekou and Shenzhen Railway Station, etc.. It experienced a 20% 
passenger growth in the first three years. In 1994, it handled 3.2 
million passengers. A second terminal, which can handle up to 12 
million passengers, is currently under design and is due to open in 
1998.76 Some people even consider that Shenzhen airport will 
eventually become the air cargo airport centre for Southern China. 
The unofficial view at Cathay Pacific Airways also favors the 
development of Shenzhen as Hong Kong's main cargo a i r p o r t . " 
Zhuhai Airport, opened in June 1995, was built with a capacity to 
handle 14 million passenger a year. Its passenger terminal, covering 
74 "Airport threat to t e r r i t o r y . South China Morning Post, Dec. 12, 1995, p. 4. 
75 "Airport officials support a new and happy medium," Hong Kong Standard. Aug. 20, 1995. 
76 "Second terminal planned as Shenzhen grows," Airport Forum. 6/1995, pp. 17. 
77 "To each its o w n . Aerospace, October, 1993, pp. 36 - 38. 
76 
an area of 90,000 sq. m. with 17 boarding bridges, is the biggest 
and best in China. The proposed link to Hong Kong via the 
Lingdingyang Bridge is already being studied by the Sino-British Co-
ordinating Committee on Major Cross-Border Infrastructure between 
Hong Kong and the Mainland (the Infrastructure Co-ordinating 
Committee).78 
The new airport for Guangzhou, to be built in the city of Huadu, is 
expected to be four times the size of Biayun airport. It will be able 
to handle 85 million passenger a year/^ more than double the 33 
million capacity of Phase 1 a of Hong Kong's new airport. Two 
runways and 73 parking bays will be built in the first phase 
d e v e l o p m e n t . 8 o Considerable interest among foreign investors has 
already been created. 
Outside the Pearl River Delta, China is planning to expand and 
upgrade 40 major airports over the next 10 to 15 years, and 
construction work has already begun. During the period from 1996 
to 2000, China will complete the expansion of Beijing airport and 
78 
A.G. Eason, "Infrastructural developments : cross-border co-ordination," Hong Kong 
Manager, May, 1995, pp. 3 - 9. 
TQ 
"China trades up from bicycles to aircraft," Jane's Airport Review. April, 1995, pp. 27 - 30. 
8° "Happy land ings. Orient Aviation. April, 1995. 
Q 1 
"China trades up from bicycles to aircraft," Jane's Airport Review. April, 1995, pp. 27 - 30. 
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start to build new airports in Guangzhou, Shanghai's Pudong, 
Nanjing and other cities. Telecommunications, navigation, air traffic 
control and meteorological facilities will get a major boost in order to 
improve s a f e t y , With a growing integrated transport network 
between Hong Kong and other parts of China, the threats from 
these new airports cannot be ignored. 
There is a need to operate the new Hong Kong airport efficiently so 
as to maintain the competitive advantage over other rivals. 
82 "China trades up from bicycles to aircraft," Jane's Airport Review. April, 1995, pp. 27 - 30. 
78 
Profit Potential 
The airport business is certainly a cash cow. Even in its first year of 
operation, a profit of HK$1.5 billion is anticipated. Net profit is 
expected to grow rapidly to HK$14 billion in 2009, a more-than-9-
fold increase in 11 years' time. Dividend payout will be possible in 
year 2000, three years after the airport opens. Borrowing for the 
first phase is expected to be fully repaid in early 2 0 0 2 , 
I ^ 
Latest estimate reviewed that total capital cost for Stages 2 to 6 
will be about HK$51.8 billion (Money of the Day). Even before the 
second terminal is fully operational in 2010, an internal rate of 
return of 6% can be generated based on the forecast. The project 
should be attractive enough for the private sector. 
Funding 
The HK$36.6 billion equity injection by the Government and 
HK$11.6 billion debt ceiling cater only for the first phase of 
development for the new airport. Pressure is building up regarding 
83 Provisional Airport Authori ty, Preliminary Information Memorandum. August 1995. 
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the needs to bring forward the second runway, and to speed up 
planning and development of subsequent developments. 
With the Exchange Fund totaled HK$460 billion as at the end of 
1995,84 can the Hong Kong Government afford to pay out HK$51.8 
billion, or 11 % of the Exchange Fund, to expedite the development 
of the new airport prior to 1997? Even after the handover, will the 
Chinese Government be willing to set aside such a huge sum of 
money for the infrastructure projects? 
The hot debate over the debt ceiling for Hong Kong's new airport 
and Chinese officials' concern over the debt of Macau Airport 
provided some insight. While full political support was given to the 
Macau airport project (Deng Xiaoping himself gave the green light in 
1980),85 China still wishes that most of the airport debts can be 
paid back before the revert of Macau to China on 20 December 
1999. 
Tapping private capital is an alternative that can relieve the 
government from the heavy financial burden and shrinking in 
reserve. 
84 Mina Pao. Mar. 27, 1996. 
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Under the AA Ordinance (Part V), AA is vested with the power to 
determine airport charges subject to approval from the Governor in 
Council. These include charges levied on aircraft operators for the 
use of runways, taxiways, apron areas, passenger processing and 
other aeronautical facilities and services. 
I 
While the actual amount of charges will not be finalized earlier than 
one year prior to airport opening, a forecast has already been 
prepared by making reference to other major international airports 
worldwide. In fact, a comparison with the "Airport and En-Route 
Aviation Charges Manual 1994� published by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) shows that AA's charges are lower 
than those at Amsterdam, Heathrow, Taipei and far below airports 
in Japan including Kansai and Narita.®® 
As long as the initial charges do not differ much from the forecast 
and regulations are imposed so that annual increase should not be 
86 Provisional Airport Authority, Preliminary Information Memorandum. Auaust 1995. 
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excessive (for example no more than inflation), objection and fear 
from airlines regarding unreasonable increase in airport change as a 
result of privatization should be minimal. 
In fact the airline (IATA) view was that "privatization could be 
supported ... given assurances of increased efficiency, safety, 
adherence to international specifications and fair user charges." ®^  
Retailers 
\ 
Retailers, who are accustomed to renting premises through 
negotiation rather than tender, should be one of the strongest 
supporters for privatization. 
One of the reasons why most airports are dominated by only a few 
operators is that, only a limited number of retailers are familiar with 
the potential of airport retail and willing to undergo the complicated 
tendering procedure to obtain the licence. 
Privatization will enhance aggressive marketing of the retail 
opportunities at the airport, the development of an efficient leasing 
87 "Latin American/Caribbean airports weigh pros and cons of privatization," ACI World 
Report. August, 1995, pp. 5-6. 
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process and the achievement of the optimal tenant mix. Retailers 
will be saved from reading thick tender documents and doing all the 
paper work, releasing time for more innovation and further 
improvement. 
Airport Users 
Passengers, meeters and greeters and well-wishers will not be much 
affected by privatization. In fact, they should be better served since 
a privatized company is probably more customer-focused. 
Authority Staff 
Currently, there is no staff union in AA. Staff are generally 
inexperienced in bargaining for their own welfare. This is a favorable 
factor to privatization. Nevertheless, provided a reasonable and 
market-oriented compensation package is offered, resistance from 
staff towards privatization should be minimal. 
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The Public 
Environmental impact should not be a concern as the new airport is 
situated away from the densely populated residential area. A natural 
noise barrier near Tung Chung ensures that residents at the 
Northern part of Lantau Island will not be affected by the 24-hour 
operation of the airport. Various regulations are already in place to 
prevent water and air pollution. 
Provided there is room for efficiency improvement, the whole 




China's determination to improve performance of state-owned 
enterprises is well-illustrated by the Regulations on Transforming the 
Operation Mechanism of State-Owned Enterprises announced on 23 
July 1992, under which construction of a shareholding system 
through corporatization was recommended. The objectives were to 
separate state ownership from management, allow mobilization and 
rational allocation of social capital, and to provide greater internal 
management cohesion so that enterprises can become efficient and 
be able to respond swiftly to changing market conditions.®® 
Enterprises became jointly owned by their employees and the 
original units. Directors and general managers were fully responsible 
for running the business. Companies received no backing from 
government, did not form part of state planing and became self-
reliant.89 They are characterized by rights and responsibilities 
88 Cherng-Shin Ouyang, System Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises. 1978 -
1993, Review and Appraisal. (Churrg-Hua Institution for Economic Research, March, 
1995), p. 14 - 18. 
89 
"Private enterprise uses diversity as asset," South China Morning Post. Dec. 19, 
1995. 
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(including property rights), and establishment of scientific 
management, etc..®° 
Along the same line, China has shown its welcome to foreign 
investment in airports. Although China's foreign investment 
regulations limit overseas investors to no more than 49% ownership 
of an airport or p o r t , private sector participation is on the rise. 
In Hainan, a special economic zone designated in 1988, foreign 
companies can take up to a 49% share in the new Meilan airport. 
Letter of intent had been signed with two US firms, including the 
Chicago airport group and one European company. Foreign firms are 
also allowed to take part in airport's management and join the board 
of the airport company.®^ 
There are also plans to sell more than US$300 million shares of 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai airports to foreign investors. Approval from 
the government is pending for the sale of B shares of Shenzhen 
airport in Shenzhen to fund construction of a second terminal 
90 
"Management flexibility a key function in reform," South China Morning Post. Dec. 
12, 1995. 
91 "Zhuhai airport stake for sale," Eastern Express. Sep. 1, 1995. 
92 "Foreign funds a boost for a i rpo r t . South China Morning Post. Dec. 9, 1995, p. 4. 
86 
building.93 Four consortiums have already expressed interest in 
taking up a stake up to 49% share of Zhuhai Airport in November 
1995.94 
Macau, whose sovereignty will be reverted to China on 20 
December 1999, has granted a 25-year concession to CAM, a 
private company established in 1989, to design, finance, construct 
and operate the airport. Although the Macau Government holds a 
5 4 . 8 6 % majority stake, other private investors are also i n v o l v e d , 
Stanley Ho's casino syndicate STDM owns 35%, while the 
remaining 10% is shared among three groups from China, Portugal 
and Macau.96 
China, however, has been very cautious in privatizing the control of 
airport's security. This is evidenced by the pull out of Cathay Pacific 
Airways from a joint venture to expand and operate Xiamen airport 
in Fujian Province, due to the argument over the operation of airport 
security and issue of tickets on behalf of other airlines.®^ 
93 "Airports to sell s t o c k s . Eastern Express. Sep. 8, 1995. 
94 
"Zhuhai wil l ing to sell 49pc of airport to overseas investors/ ' South China Morning 
Post. Nov. 22, 1995. 
95 CAM - Macau International Airport Co. information package & brochures. 
Qg 
"Airport officials support a new and happy medium," Hona Kong Standard. Aug. 20, 1995. 
97 Airports. 19 December, 995, pp.489. 
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Nevertheless, given China's desire to enter into the World Trade 
Organization, the trend of trade and investment liberalization is 
clear. 
Together with the elimination of political uncertainties after the 
transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to the mainland after 1997, 
and the continual effort of China to hold down inflation and stabilize 
its currency, investment risk should be tolerable. 
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Summary 
In a nut shell, most of the critical success factors for privatization 
discussed earlier appear to exist for AA:-
1. Competition from neighboring airports is keen. 
2. There is potential for large efficiency gain via:-
• down-sizing; 
• an overall comprehensive procedural review; 
• a change in ownership and hence corporate culture; and 
• a reward system reform which boosts morale and pay for 
performance, etc. 
3. The project is not only self-financing but also an attractive investment 
opportunity. 
4. Given the current setting, privatization will likely be perceived by staff 
as a positive move towards localization, streamlining unproductive 
processes and departments and a commitment to reward those who 
really perform. 
5. Other parties, including airlines, retailers, airport users and the public 
will also benefit, or at least, will not be worse off. 
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6. Little controversial social consequence is anticipated. 
The question then boils down again, to government support. With a clear 
and persistent direction from the Chinese Government to invite private 
capital to airports, investment risk should be minimal and privatization is 
likely to be successful. 
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The Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
In this section, we will examine the Mass Transit Railway 
Corporation (MTRC) strategically using an "environmental analysis" 
approach with particular attention to the critical success factors for 
privatization discussed previously. 
We will review the internal environment including organization 
structure, management and control, financial conditions, operational 
performance and future development plan. The external environment 
will be analyzed in the light of market competition, government 
control and political environment. The strengths and weaknesses of 
the Corporation will be established by benchmarking its performance 
with other similar metros, particularly on the ground of efficiency, 
service quality, fares, productivity, safety performance, profitability, 
cost-effectiveness, etc.. In each part of the analyses, the needs, 
benefits and feasibility of privatizing will be contemplated based on 
the company's characteristics and similar practices world-wide. 
At the end of this section, conclusions could be drawn with respect 
to the pros and cons for MTRC to privatize, the improvement 
potential, the key underlying deterrents and motivates, the 
availability of private investors and the possible private financing 




MTRC is a quasi-government body wholly owned by the 
Government. The three operating lines of the Mass Transit Railway 
were opened in stages between October 1979 and August 1989. 
The Mass Transit Railway is a metropolitan underground / elevated 
railway network comprising three lines with a combined length of 
43.2 kilometers. The network has 38 stations and is worked by 
over 90 sets of eight-car trains. The average number of weekday 
passengers in 1 995 was 2.4 million, being the most intensely used 
metro in the world proportionate to its length. One of the 
Corporation's objectives is to provide cost effective mass transit 
service to the community at large under commercial prudent 
principle. 
Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning the construction of the New Airport in Hong Kong 
between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the 
United Kingdom, the Corporation was invited by the Hong Kong 
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Government to negotiate the terms under which it would design, 
construct, finance and operate the new Lantau and Airport Railway. 
MTRC is responsible for building a 34-km rail network with an 
express link to the new airport at Chek Lap Kok and a domestic 
Tung Chung Line. The Airport Project is now in full swing and most 
of the civil and electrical and mechanical contracts have been 
awarded. The cost of the Lantau and Airport Railway was estimated 
to be around HK$34 billion and the railway is scheduled to open in 
June 1998. 
In addition to the core business of operating the mass transit service 
and construction of the new Lantau and Airport Railway, the other 
businesses of the Corporation include Property Development and 
Estate Management, Commercial and Advertising. According to the 
1994 annual report, the non-fare revenue contributed 16% of the 
total revenue. 
Revenue Source HK$million % 
^ ^ ^ 4^3jg ^ “™"*""""""-""""""^  “ 
Advertising 239 4 
Kiosk Rental “ 82 2 
Estate Management and 463 9 
Rental Income 
Other Income 32 1 
Total 5,131 100 
Source: Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1 994. p. 75. 
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Corporate Objectives 
The MTRC ordinance specifies that the purpose of the Corporation 
is: 
To construct and operate, on prudent commercial 
principles, a Mass Transit Railway System having 
regard to the reasonable requirements of Hong Kong's 
public transport system. 
This objective stresses the commercial operating principles, and is in 




The high level organization chart of MTRC is shown in Appendix 7. 
The Operating Railway is the major business of the Corporation. 
Over the decade, Property Development, Estate Management, 
Marketing and Commercial have also evolved as secondary business 
units that cannot be segregated. Due to the huge size of the 
Corporation, there are many independent functional departments to 
support the operations of the railway, such as the Finance, Human 
Resources and Audit and Management Services, etc. 
Management and ownership 
Chairman of the Board is also the Chief Executive of the 
Corporation. Among the nine board members and chairman, two are 
representatives from the Government, six are from the private 
sector and one new member is from the Bank of China (See 
Appendix 2). Clearly, both private and public interests are well-
represented and the board is not dominated by government officials. 
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In April 1995, Mr. Jack C.K. So, who has strong commercial and 
property development background, was appointed the new Chinese 
Chairman. It marked the Government's commitment to manage and 
operate the railway under commercial prudent principles. 
MTRC currently has over 7,000 staff. The existing railway 
operations excluding the estate management has staff establishment 
of over 5,600. The Projects Division, although relatively short term 
in nature, is employing over 1,000 professional staff to manage the 
airport project. 
The staff turnover in 1 994 was around 6%, relatively low among 
other private sectors or utilities. In addition, the regular Staff 
Attitude Survey also revealed staff's general satisfaction towards 
the Corporation. 
Overall, MTRC has no major operational or administration 




The three operating lines, namely Tsuen Wan Line, Kwun Tong Line 
and Island Lines, are operated and maintained by one Operations 
Division. The three lines are interconnecting at many interchange 
stations like Prince Edward, Quarry Bay and Admiralty. The 
operations of the three lines are supervised under one Operating 
Control Centre at Kowloon Bay for effective train management and 
mobilization. 
The existing fleet of over 90 sets of 8-car trains are stabled and 
serviced at three depots at Tsuen Wan, Chai Wan and Kowloon Bay. 
Major overhaul services are carried out at the Kowloon Bay 
Workshop. The railway infrastructures are managed by the Civil 
Works Section, E&M Section, Signalling Section, Automatic Fare 
Collection System and Computer Control System Section, etc.. 
At the department level, the engineering organization is arranged 
and managed as functional units, and area-based control such as 
individual depot management is only exercised at subsection level. 
The supporting units such as planning, servicing development, 
design and safety teams are centralized on section level to promote 
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skill and technology development, and facilitate procedures 
standardization among the three lines. 
This functional organization has been working extremely well in the 
last 1 5 years. It minimizes duplication of effort and allows flexibility 
in localized operation. Minor re-structuring exercises in the 
subsection level have been taking place to provide better front-line 
service and improve operational efficiency. 
However, the existing functional structure of the Operating Railway 
is not ready for direct sale or franchising to private operators. The 
organization needs to be separated into smaller infrastructure or 
vehicle entities like the BR prior to privatization. Due to the 
complexity of mass transit operations, it is always difficult either to 
find one private operator that is both competent and experienced in 
local metro operations, or it will be unsafe to let all the operations 
go into the hands of one operator. 
In addition, it is believed that due to the heavy level of traffic 
interaction and interdependency of the three operating lines, 
separation of the line management and operations functions will 
hamper communication efficiency, complicate co-ordination and 
decrease flexibility in spare train mobilization. This obviously will not 
bring extra efficiency gain to the MTR operation. 
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Customer Satisfaction 
MTRC is frequently accredited due to its continuous strive for 
customer satisfaction. It has received numerous awards and 
recognition from the various public bodies or media on customer 
service performance:-
"Best Service Award" 7994 and 1995, by Next Magazine. 
"Highest Customer Service Ranking, “ Public Attitude Towards 
Various Public Transport on Customer Service, SRH Survey 
December 1995. 
The attitude of MTRC towards customer service and the actual 
performance of the Corporation are even unrivaled among other 
private sector businesses like Hong Kong Telecom, China Motor Bus 
and Kowloon Motor Bus. 
To demonstrate the attainment of its customer service pledge, the 
Corporation is proactive in setting up Customer Services Targets on 
its operational and maintenance services, and publishing the actual 
performance regularly. In addition, the Corporation is committed to 
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"continuous improvement" and tries every effort to keep improving 
its targets annually, (see Appendix 11) 
To collate customer's feedback widely and effectively, different 
forms of campaign have been launched. They include as the 
Passenger Liaison Group, Coffee Evenings in Stations, Liaison Train, 
Hotlines, Annual MTR Passenger Survey, etc.. 
The continuous growth in market share, and positive responses 
from passengers, staff, media and the community at large, 
evidenced the success of MTRC in its focus on customers. 
The remarkable standard of customer service already achieved by 
the Corporation clearly precludes the necessity to go private, in the 
context of service improvement. 
Market Analysis 
In the following pages, the market structure of Hong Kong 
transportation, the existing marketing share of MTR and the 
intensity of competition among its major transport competitors are 
analyzed. As mentioned in earlier sections, a major pre-requisite for 
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privatization is that some form of competition could be introduced 
to regulate the performance of the company. 
Market Structure ofTransportation Services in Hong Kong 
Over the last ten years, travel pattern in the Territory has been 
transformed by the opening of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) in 
the urban areas, the modernization of the Kowloon Canton Railway 
(KCR) in New Territories, and the opening of the Light Rail Transit 
(LRT) in North West New Territories. 
However, the bus companies are still taking major share of Hong 
Kong's public transport s y s t e m . The largest being Kowloon Motor 
Bus (KMB) which operates almost 3200 vehicles and carries 2.8 
million passenger a day. On Hong Kong Island, China Motor Bus 
(CMB) and Citybus operate 1200 buses and carry 750,000 
passenger a day. The Public Light Buses and maxicabs which run on 
less patronized routes, carry about 1.7 million passenger a day. 
Total non-rail movements amount to 5.3 million passenger a day. 
Qg 
G.E.Tedbury, "Transport in Hong Kong," Highways & Transportation. September, 
1995. 
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For railway transports, the LRT which commenced operation in 
1988, carries a daily patronage of 500,000. The 34-km Kowloon 
Canton Railway carries a daily patronage of 700,000 including the 
cross-border traffic. The 43-km MTR is the longest rail network in 
Hong Kong at present and carries 2.4 million passenger a day. In 
1994, it took up 27.8% of all transport movements and 67.1% of 
cross harbour movements. 
There is still a market niche in Hong Kong for MTRC to further 
expand its network and increase its market share. 
Regarding the ownership of transport companies, all the non-rail 
transports are owned by the private or public listed companies. On 
the contrary, all the three Railway Companies are owned by the 
Hong Kong Government. 
In summary, with a 4 -firm concentration ratio of over 90%, the 
market structure in Hong Kong can be regarded as a "Tight 
O l i g o p o l y " , 9 9 . That is, no single firm dominates the market and the 
combined power of the 4-firm is a dilution of the simple effect that a 
single firm with the same market share would have. In other words, 
99 
William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organisation. Chapter 3, 3rd Edition, 
Prentice Hall, 1990. 
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the oligopolists may co-ordinate as tightly as if they were a genuine 
monopoly. This "collusion" phenomenon is obvious during the 
annual fare adjustment period when all the transport companies 
unanimously raise their fares to attain higher joint profits. 
Transport Planning and Railway Development Strategy in Hong Kong 
The four existing railway networks in Hong Kong actually have no 
major overlapping routes, thanks to the well-planned Railway 
Development S t r a t e g y , � | n fact, they operate in a complementary 
fashion rather than as direct competitors. The interconnections of 
the rails have been providing efficient and reliable mass transit 
service within the territory and generating new demands for their 
counterparts. 
Looking into the future, new extensions are being planned to expand 
the catchment areas of existing networks as well as creating 
demand through the associated property development in those 
areas. 
� Hong Kong Government Transport Branch, Railway Development Strategy. 
December, 1994. p.11 • 
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Although new road projects e.g. the Route 3 Project and Eastern 
Kowloon Express, etc., are in full swing to further improve Hong 
Kong's highway network, they will not be able to cope with 
unrestrained growth in road traffic. The limited spaces for heavily 
built-up areas make it impossible to develop extra roads. Over the 
past decade, the mode of travel in Hong Kong has been transformed 
by the development of mass transit passenger rail systems. Superior 
attributes of mass transit are high capacity, safe and reliable, less 
pollution and immune to road congestion. All these support the 
continued development of mass transit systems in Hong Kong. 
However, the rail links remained to be developed are financially less 
viable, compared with the existing lines. Most of the schemes, such 
as the Ma On Shan Light Rail, Tseung Kwan 0 Extension, Kennedy 
Town Extension and South Island Line pass through under-develop 
and less populated areas. This type of inadequate demand problem 
is now adversely affecting the Tuen Mun Light Rail Transit which 
consistently reports loss, up to HK$180 million in 1 995. Clearly, the 
Government should use economic yardsticks in addition to financial 
return to justify new investments on mass transit. In order to attract 
private sector's participation in such projects, subsidization, equity 
injection or other financial initiatives by the Government seem to be 
inevitable. 
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To improve information exchange with China on major 
infrastructural projects in Hong Kong and Guangdong, arrangements 
have been formalized at the end of 1994 by establishing the 
Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee.^®^ Issues such as the 
Lingdingyang Bridge which would link Zhuhai with Hong Kong, and 




As mentioned before, the major competitors of the existing MTR 
operation are Bus, Ferry and Kowloon Canton Railway. Although the 
market structure of Hong Kong Transport is "Tight Oligopoly" in 
nature, MTRC is still improving its service quality, maintaining and 
pursuing cost-effective operation to fulfill its "commercial prudent" 
objective. 
i ° i A.G.Eason, "Infrastructural Developments: Cross-Border Co-ordination," Hong Kong 
Manager, May, 1995. 
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In order to explain the profitability of the MTRC, we attempt to 
analyze the competitive strategy of the Corporation in the context of 
industry analysis and competitive p o s i t i o n i n g � 
MTRC has been enjoying competitive edge in the transportation 
industry. The overall intensity of rivalry of MTR with other transport 
competitors is relatively low, the only direct competitor is bus. The 
huge investment cost and franchised operating licence are great 
barriers of entry to potential competitors. The fast and reliable 
service offered by MTRC, especially compared with the congested 
cross-harbour road traffic gives the Corporation great bargaining 
power as a service provider. Although the air-conditioned bus 
service is imposing some threat of substitute product, the overall 
service reliability and time to travel are inferior compared with mass 
transit. In addition, the regular demand for mass transit service is so 
enormous that the existing bus service do not have the capability 
and ability to substitute it at all. 
Regarding competitive positioning, MTR has successfully sustained 
its competitive advantage by being more responsive to customers' 
102 Charles W.L. Hill and Jones Gareth R., Strategic Management Theory: An Integrated 
Approach. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995. 
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needs and differentiated itself by providing fast, reliable and safe 
service. 
The favourable industrial environment, low rivalry among the "tight 
oligopoly" competitors and Government's Policy on non-paralleling 
of railway and bus routes, have fostered the profitability of the 
corporation and its differentiation compared with bus. 
It is believed that even if the existing railway lines were separately 
franchised to private operators, the non-overlapping routes of the 
three lines would not introduce direct competitions among the 
operators. The favorable market conditions still prevail. 
New Airport Lines 
For the new Airport Railway, foreseeable competitors of the Tung 
Chung Line are other franchised Air Bus Routes to be operated by 
KMB / CMB / CityBus which will convene passenger from the town 
centers to the new airport at Chek Lap Kok. The Government is still 
deciding whether to allow MTRC to run the Coach Service to the 
Airport so that a better and prompt arrangement could be made 
during any major railway incidents. This will be similar to the kind of 
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Feeder Bus Service being operated by the Kowloon Canton Railway 
Corporation for Light Rail Transit and Heavy Rail. 
If MTRC is really appointed the sole Air Bus Operator, the 
competition faced by the Corporation will be reduced and it will be 
less favorable for the Corporation to be privatized. 
For the prestige Airport Express Line, convenient facilities like the 
ln-town Check-in facilities will be provided at Hong Kong and 
Kowloon stations. The service will provide airport railway 
passengers facilities to check in their flight with their luggage at 
town centre. A baggage handling fee will be charged to the 
passengers but will be maintained at a reasonable level to attract 
the potential u s e r s ^ 
However, the major threat to the airport express line is whether the 
capacity of the Hong Kong's new airport at Chek Lap Kok and thus 
the Airport Railway can be fully utilized. Given the passenger 
forecast by AA could be sustained, the airport express line can be 
fully and economically utilized. 
103 " |n- town check-in for new airport," South China Morning Post. Dec. 8, 1995. 
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Financial Conditions 
Loans Outstanding and Debt/Equity Ratio 
MTRC has been bearing heavy debts since it commenced operation. 
The total amount of outstanding loans was HK$18,121 million at 
the end of 1994. Outstanding debt has remained within the region 
of HK$20,000 million in the last ten years due to the continual 
expenditure on improving and maintaining assets, primarily to 
improve operational safety and providing a higher level of customer 
service. 
Thanks to the Shareholders' Funds which have been increased by 
satisfactory result due to property revaluation, the debt / equity ratio 
including property revaluation surplus has been reduced to 1.5:1 in 
1994 compared with 2.8:1 in 1990 and 4.9:1 in 1985， 
The other key financial performance figures are summarized in the 
table as follows:-
i°4 Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994, p. 56-57. 
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Financial Indicator 1994 1993 1990 1985 
Revenue (HK$m) 5,131 4,528 3 , 1 6 4 ~ 1,440 
Profit/Loss 1,038 7 ^ (108) (794) 
(HK$m) 
Debt/Equity ratio 1.5:1 1.7:1 2.8:1 4.9:1 ~ 
Operating Profit as 56.4% 56.5% 58.4% 56.2% 
a percentage of 
revenue 
Interest and 1,269 1,251 1,846 1,199 
Finance charges 
(HK$ m) 
Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994. p. 56-57. 
The heavy debt of MTRC has been a need and excuse for annual 
fare increase. However, it will become a big burden and key threat if 
the corporation loses the autonomy to revise fare in one day. This 
will be further elaborated in the following section. 
New Airport Railway Financing 
After the repeated discussions at the Airport Committee of the Joint 
Liaison Group, agreement was finally reached in November 1994. 
The new airport railway will be financed by HK$23.7 billion 
government equity injection and a capped debt of HK$11.4 billion. 
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The Hong Kong Government would provide further financial support 
in the unlikely event that the total cost exceeds HK$35.1 billion. 
The LAR Project is financially robust on a stand-alone basis and will 
produce an internal rate of return at 10% for an operating period of 
forty years_io5 
Cash Flow of Airport Railway is depicted in the following table: 
Cash Flow March 1991 (NPV) HK$ billion 
Fare Revenue 53.1 
Other Commercial and 5.7 
Property Income 
Operating Costs (29.0) 
Construction Costs (22.1) 
Capital Expenditure and (4.9) 
Replacement 
Total 2.8 
Internal Rate of Return IRR 10% (40 Years) 
Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994. 
There is no foreseeable demand for additional capital in order to 
complete the LAR Project. 
i°5 Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994. 
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Future extensions and rail links 
The Corporation's financial projections are very strong. Without 
further equity support, the Corporation has the ability to finance 
another new extension of HK$10 billion - the Tseung Kwan 0 
Extension, following the Airport Railway Construction Project. 
According to the new Railway Development Strategy published by 
the Transport Branch of the Hong Kong Government/®® the 
extension of MTR to Tseung Kwan 0 and alignment work from 
Quarry Bay to Tin Hau or North Point will be completed before 
2001. 
MTRC is a metropolitan rail network rather than a railway. With the 
handover of sovereignty to the Chinese Government, the fate of the 
future railway extensions in Hong Kong will inevitably be restrained 
by the existing metro practice in major China cities like Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
As discussed in the previous section on privatization of China's 
metros and railways, the Chinese Government is advocating the 
106 Hong Kong Government Transport Branch, Railway Development Strategy. 
December, 1994. p. 50. 
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BOT financing scheme with restrictions on the private sector. For 
large scale projects like the Beijing Line 2, the Government forms a 
joint venture with the foreign investor to form the BOT arrangement, 
the prime objective is obviously to retain certain extent of control 
during the BOT period. 
Therefore, it is very likely that the future railway links in Hong Kong 
such as the Kennedy Town Extension or even the Western Corridor 
Railway will be financed through BOT, Joint Venture or similar 
schemes to reduce the equity injections required by the future SAR 
Government. During the transition, the Chinese Government will 
inevitably exercise joint venture scheme with the foreign investors 
to exercise its control on Hong Kong transport from the very 
beginning. 
Asset Replacement 
The Tsuen Wan, Kwun Tong and Island lines have been operating 
for 11 to 1 5 years. There is a comprehensive investment program 
on station modernization, Rolling Stock refurbishment, major plant 
replacement and Signalling System Upgrade to improve the 
passenger throughput and upkeep service reliability. The Corporation 
announced in 1995 a HK$8 billion 7-year capital projects 
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improvement program to further enhance existing MTR services. It 
is also projected that 10-15 years later, the existing rolling stocks 
and infrastructure will be operating for 30 years and will be due for 
replacement at the same time. 
It is perceptible from the above that the Corporation will require 
substantial equity to replace and improve its facilities with the 
progressive aging of its equipment. Therefore, an agreement on 
"Operating Costs" and "Asset Replacement Funding" should be 
formalized with the Government for future asset replacement. In the 
case of Singapore (See Appendix 5), °^^  the Government is obliged 
to inject part of the equity to the private transport operators for 
asset replacement except the depreciated portion. Ambiguous asset 
replacement responsibility is a huge burden and deterrent to 
privatization as few private operators will like to shoulder this 
responsibility. 
Credit Ratings 
MTRC's investment grade credit ratings are fiercely guarded by the 
Corporation. The need to maintain good credibility - by keeping to 
107 "A world class and transport system," White Paper Presented to Parliament by Command of 
The President of the Republic of Singapore. 2nd January 1996, p.58-71. 
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agreed debt-equity and interest-covers ratios - provides the 
cornerstone of MTRC's negotiations with the Government on the 
levels of additional paid-in and authorized equity, as well as the 
extent of property development rights associated with the projects. 
According to the 1994 MTRC Annual Report, the Corporation has 
maintained top short term credit ratings in short term commercial 
paper while long term ratings remain in investment grade categories. 
Commitment to maintaining a strong financial base and enhanced 
creditors' and investors' confidence are top priorities. 
Rating Agencies Commercial Paper Long Term Ratings 
Standard and Poors A-1 A + / A ^ 
Moody's P-1 A l / A 3 a 
The Japan Bond A-1 AA /AA- ^ 
Research Institute 
Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994, p. 63. 
g 
Long term ratings for Hong Kong dollar denominated debt and foreign 
currency denominated debt. 
Long term ratings for debt maturing prior to and after July 1997 respectively. 
115 
In December 1994, Moody's Investors Service surprisingly 
downgraded MTRC's debt rating by two grades, from Aa2 to A l ， 
The reason given for the move was that the local economy was 
becoming more integrated into China and that it might go through 
"periods of political uncertainty, MTRC expressed its 
disappointment at that time by responding that the decision 
represented a fundamental misapprehension of the protection to 
Hong Kong under the Basic Law and Joint Declaration. This is the 
first warning sign of decreasing investor's confidence on China's 
influence on the financial stability of the Corporation after the 
handover. 
It can be noted that a relatively lower credit rating was given by the 
Japan Bond Research Institute on those debts maturing after 1997, 
representing their reservation on the Corporation's profitability after 
1 997. Fortunately, the overall credit rating stands at AA-, which is 
still an "excellent rating for investment". 
Although MTRC is 100%-owned by the Hong Kong Government, 
the Corporation itself has excellent credibility in international 
financial markets especially in the Bond Market. MTRC was ranked 
108 "Moody's downgrade MTRC debt rating," South China Morning Post. Dec. 11, 1993. 
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the "Most Impressive Asian Borrower" by Euroweek's poll of market 
participants in December 1994. 
In October 1995, the Corporation announced the issue of 10-year 
maturity Yankee bond lead managed by Goldman, Sachs & Co. This 
issue received inspiring responses from the market and the amount 
issued was increased to US$300 million. Most of the orders were 
placed with US investors. This again demonstrates the high credit of 
the Corporation in the US market. 
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Property Development 
Property development and recurrent rental income have been major 
contributors of non-fare revenue to the Corporation. In 1994, the 
revenue from property rental and management accounts amounted 
to HK$463 million, 9% of the total revenue. 
For the new Airport Railway, property development of five sites 
associated with the Airport Railway will be a significant challenge 
over the next decade. A total investment of over HK$200 billion on 
the five sites will produce over twenty-four thousand flats, sixteen 
office towers, nine hotels and five major shopping centers. 
All the property projects will be tendered out to the developers for 
design, construction and development. The advantage being that 
the land premium would be paid by private property developers. As 
on other MTR lines property development such as the Central and 
Admiralty, the Corporation's share of profits generated from these 
property developments, after all costs including land premium to 
Government, will be used to fund some of the later construction of 
the new LAR project. 
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Construction of strategic and massive development such as Central 
Station or Kowloon Station, however, is too big for a single 
consortium to handle. By splitting up the project into several phases, 
the construction work will be become more manageable and 
attractive to the developers. 
All the above financial arrangements aim at reducing the one-off 
capital injection into the property projects, as well as spreading out 
the supply over 10 years so as not to compromise the project cost. 
The overall property development strategy is to maximize the return 
from the infrastructural development and reduce the risk to the 
property markets. 
In parallel, the property development will generate land premium for 
the Government which will probably exceed the HK$23.7 billion 
capital injected by the Government into the railway project. 
It is remarkable that Hong Kong's property development associated 
with railway development can generate adequate land premium for 
the Government to finance the project. This attracts Government to 




One of the primary motives behind the worldwide examples of 
privatization is to improve the operational efficiency. 
MTRC's management team has been expending immense resources 
in human resources development through training, management 
development, succession plan and career development. In addition, 
organization revitalization has been carried out internally to improve 
safety performance, operational efficiency, service reliability, and 
provide better customer service. The existing standard of 
performance of MTRC operations can be reflected from a recent 
benchmarking exercise with four other similar metros. 
In 1994, five worldwide metros assigned the Railway Technology 
Strategy Centre (RTSC) of the University of London to initiate a 
feasibility study of benchmarking analysis. The five metros are 
characterized by high passenger volume, predominantly within 
metropolitan districts.^°^ 
109 Mass Transit Railway Corporation, MTRC's Fare Determination Autonomy. 7 March 
1996. 
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The performance indicators used for benchmarking and the 
respective ranking of MTRC under each attribute are summarized in 
the table below:-
Attributes Measurement MTRC 
Ranking 
Density No. of passengers carried per 1 
route length km 
Train Reliability % of passenger journeys on time 1 
Staff Efficiency No. of passengers carried per 1 
staff hour unit 
Cost Efficiency Operating cost per car km 1 . 
Asset Utilization Passenger kilometers per capacity 1 
kilometer 
Equipment Car km operated between delays 2 
Performance 
Source: Mass Transit Railway Corporation. MTRC's Fare Determination 
Autonomy. 7 March 1996 
The details of the five metros and the performance figures are given 
in Appendix 8. 
MTRC is undoubtedly heading the other four metros in all aspects 
except equipment performance. Most importantly, MTRC is the only 
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metro that is self-sustainable from its operating revenue without 




The passenger demand for the Hong Kong Metro is extremely 
enormous, large enough to generate substantial operating revenue 
under which it can fulfill its objective to operate in accordance with 
prudent commercial principles. One distinct difference of MTRC 
from other railways is that it is profitable and does not require 
subsidy from the Government during its 1 6-year operation. 
The MTRC Ordinance has vested the Corporation the power and 
autonomy to determine its fare and the Legislative Council and 
Executive Council are playing an advisory role only on this matter. 
Notwithstanding this privilege, MTRC has been setting its fare 
policy based on the "User-Pay" Principle, the MTRC's success 
formula. 
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Before the annual fare review each year, MTRC will carry out the 
Fare Consultation Process to establish the required fare increase. 
This includes: 
• Conduct Passenger Survey on Public Acceptability of 
proposed fare increase and value for money service. 
• Review fare competitiveness with regard to the Service 
Quality, Fares of other Transport modes and Market Share; 
• Make reference to recent economic growth, inflation and 
purchasing power, financial revenue, capital expenditure 
and operating cost growth, etc. 
It is obvious that MTRC has been very disciplined and tactful in fare 
setting. The fare of MTRC has been consistently kept below the 
inflation and wage increase. From 1980-1995, the average annual 
increase of MTR Average Fare was 7.8%, which is lower than the 
Consumer Price Index A (Average 8.6% p.a.) and the HK Payroll 
Index (Average 14.0% p.a . ) . ”� (See Appendix 9) 
As expected, the fare policy and the existing fare level are widely 
accepted by the public in terms of value for money. From a recent 
110 Mass Transit Railway Corporation, MTRC's Fare Determination Autonomy. 7 March 
1996. 
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SRH Survey on the Public Attitude Towards Various Public 
Transport Fares in Terms of Value for Money, MTRC was rated as 
the second best transportation service after Tram. (See Appendix 
10) 
The openness of its fare policy is even better than many of the 
private sector counterparts. 
New Airport Railway 
According to the Corporation's forecast, the operating revenue from 
the future Airport Railway comprises fare revenue from passengers, 
income generated from commercial activities e.g. advertisement and 
kiosk rentals, and recurrent estate management income contributed 
from the property developed along the line. 
It has been estimated that the Airport Railway will be able to 
achieve an operating profit from the first years of operation. 
Operating profit after depreciation will increase steadily in 
conjunction with progressive increase in passengers and revenue. 
Net profit can also be expected with the additional share of profits 
from the property developments less interest expense. 
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Over an operating period of forty years, the new railway is expected 
to produce an internal rate of return at 10% which ties in with the 
Corporation's investment objective. 
Threats to Autonomous Fare Policy 
However, there is growing threat from the Legislative Council 
regarding the Corporation's fare policy especially in the time of 
poor economy. Both the Hong Kong Government and the 
Corporation argued for continued autonomy in fare determination to 
ensure cost effectiveness in the delivery of the product to satisfy 
customers, creditors and the shareholder (the Government). Given 
the foreseeable continuous debt requirement, the confidence of 
creditors must be secured. 
The existing fare policy could be maintained in the short term. In 
the medium term, with the progressive influence from the Chinese 
Government, the commitment of the future SAR Government on 
autonomous fare policy could not be insured, as shown from the 
Beijing Metro case. Unless the Corporation is privatized and granted 
the right to adjust its fare, the experiences of how the China 
Central Government influenced the local Railway fare policy tell us 
that the degree of autonomy will inevitably be restrained if 
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commitment from China ceases. In the worst case, such 
Government-controlled fare policy will result in shortfall in income, 
and subsequent subsidy from the Government. More severely, the 
loss of creditability of the Corporation may turn it into another 
inefficient, unsafe and unreliability railway system commonly found 
around the world. 
As mentioned in earlier lesson, the Corporation still retains the right 
to negotiate with the Chinese Government in case dispute arises on 
the fare policy as set out in the MTRC Ordinance. The regional 
appeal centres in the Southeast Asia region could be used to settle 
this kind of dispute after 1997. These establishments can safeguard 
the Corporation's autonomy in fare setting stipulated by the MTRC 
Ordinance. 
Overall, the Fare Policy is one of the key issues that the Corporation 
must retain control. A failure of which will result in non-profitable 
operation and loss of power to raise capital. 
Employee Compensation 
The MTRC Retirement scheme was established in 1977 概 and all 
staff are compelled to enter the scheme. In 1994 members 
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contributed HK$54 million and the Corporation contributed HK$176 
miNion to the Scheme. Wyatt Company (HK) limited, an independent 
actuary confirmed that the assets of the scheme, which are 
separated from those of the Corporation, totaling HK$1,712 million 
were more than adequate to cover the aggregate value of members' 
vested benefits had the scheme been discontinued and the funding 
level in percentage terms being 100%. 
It is typical in public sector privatization that the company is faced 
with the problem of paying huge sum of compensation to staff for 
pension. The one-off payment to repay the staff or even transferal 
of provident fund to other company's provident fund scheme will 
require substantial amount of cash. 
The well-managed provident fund scheme facilities privatization of 
the Corporation. This factor cannot be a valid deterrent or an excuse 
used by the Union to prevent the Corporation from going privatized. 
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Political 
The Local Government 
The Hong Kong Government respects and supports the Mass Transit 
for the vital role it plays in the economic and social well being of the 
colony, and even post 1997, it is unlikely that this feeling will 
change significantly in a short period. 
In December 1995, Mr. Chen Ziying, Vice Director of the Hong 
Kong and Macao Affairs Office, affirmed the contributions of the 
Corporation to the prosperity of Hong Kong at a meeting held with a 
delegation led by MTRC Chairman Mr. Jack So in Beijing.”i At the 
meeting, Mr. Chen also expressed the wish that all MTRC staff 
would continue to work for the Corporation after the return of 
sovereignty to China. "The existing format of operation and 
management systems of the Corporation will also remain unchanged 
after 1 997. Its business will also be further developed, '• said Mr. 
Chen. 
1 ” Mass Transit Railway Corporation, MTR Express - MTRC Continues to operate on 
existing format with smooth transition for staff through 1997. 19 December 1995. 
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Mr. Chen also answered the concern of many MTRC staff by stating 
that the MTRC will be accountable only to the SAR Government and 
the Central Government will not interfere. This is in keeping with the 
spirit of the Basic Law. 
China,s Influences 
The macro impact of China's regain of sovereignty after 1997 need 
to be addressed in every parts of the Corporation's long term 
strategy. The confidence of private sector on long term 
infrastructure projects like railway depends very much on the 
political stability and socio-economic conditions of Hong Kong. 
The signing of the Joint Declaration marked the commitment by 
China to assure the stability of Hong Kong over the next 50 years. 
There are many foundations that can honor China's agreement on 
Hong Kong.ii2 
Firstly, China is directing its effort to promote the "one country, 
two systems" formula as a basis for eventual unity with Taiwan. 
1 1 ? 
William H. Overholt (1993), China the Next Economic Superpower. (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson), p.118-161. 
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Despite the setback after Tiananmen Square event, China has stuck 
to this principal. 
Secondly, two-third of foreign direct investment in China comes 
from Hong Kong, and 25 to 30% of all foreign exchange earnings 
come through Hong Kong. Both Hong Kong and China have 
benefited from the close relationship because of the opportunities 
for economic growth. Hong Kong handles about 90% of 
Guangdong's exports and Guangdong handles more than one-fifth of 
China's exports. Overall, Hong Kong is an efficient and salient point 
to China for capital, technology, trade, transport, tourism and 
management. 
However, on the pessimistic side, with Hong Kong being part of 
China, there exists risk that the administration of Hong Kong 
inevitably will become politicized or overwhelmed by the Chinese 
Law. China's corruption and crime problem and its potential 
instability due to future leadership cannot be undermined. Many 
companies in Hong Kong have diversified their business 
geographically beyond their normal business objectives, for example, 
the purchase of the Midland Bank in Britain and Marine Midland in 
USA by Hong Kong Bank. Nevertheless, such "soft" effect cannot 
be dealt with effectively by any specific corporate strategies. 
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In addition, the development of railway in China has been in full 
swing as mentioned in the Case Study section. All these give the 
conviction that China is now very open and enthusiastic to expand 
its infrastructure network and welcome foreign investment. There 
will be no motive for China to suppress the transport development 
in Hong Kong. 
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Summary 
MTRC Operating Railwav and the T.antau and Airport Ra i lway 
After we have examined the internal and external environment of 
MTRC and the relevancy of the critical success factors for 
privatization, we come to the conclusion that it is not worthwhile 
for existing MTRC Operating Railway and the under-construction 
Lantau and Airport Railway to go private. The existing superb 
operating performance, financial position, autonomous fare policy 
and "unchanged" commitment from China Officials do not justify 
such a drastic but non-necessary change in operating regime. 
The following summarize our arguments for the MTRC Operating 
Railway and the Lantau and Airport Railway not to go private:-
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1. The Corporation has been operating on prudent commercial 
principles. Decision making process is less bureaucratic 
compared with AA or the Government. We have explained that 
there will only be small efficiency gain but substantial trade-off 
if the company is managed by the private sector. 
2. MTRC has been striving to improve its service quality. Its 
equipment standards outperform its private sector counterparts 
both locally and worldwide. The performance risk is high if the 
company goes private. 
3. MTRC is operating a profitable business both on its railway 
service and property development. The existing Operating 
Railway is one of the extremely rare metros that can generate 
sufficient revenue to repay debts and sustain growth without 
any regular government subsidy. The Lantau and Airport 
Railway Project is financially viable on its own and all the fund 
raising arrangements have been settled. Therefore, the effect 
of privatization on increase in revenue or reduction of cost to 
both railways is likely be marginal. 
4. The Corporation is financially capable of raising additional 
capitals for all planned asset replacement and the Lantau and 
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Airport Railway without further equity injection from 
Government. There is no short-term need for further capital 
except for new extensions like Tseung Kwan 0 , Kennedy 
Town, East Kowloon and South Island Line. 
5. The existing mechanism for motivating employees is well-
established, fair and transparent. Together with a fair 
performance appraisal and rewarding system, staff attitude and 
morale are reasonably good. Privatization may result in 
unnecessary lay-off and create instability within the specialized 
railway workforce. 
6. The existing intervention from Government is already low, 
particularly on the fare policy and dividend repayment 
requirement. MTRC is very independent in its operation as if it 
is a "franchise operator" offered by the Government with 
everlasting concession. 
7. The credit rating of the Corporation is well-maintained because 
of its proven operating performance and strong financial 
positions. Investors may have less confidence in the debt-
repaying ability of the Corporation if it is privatized. It would be 
detrimental if the Corporation loses its credibility and is forced 
to raise money at a higher cost. 
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8. The current setting has been blessed by the Chinese 
Government - "The Corporation can continue to operate on 
existing format with smooth transition for staff through 1997". 
This reduces political risk and strengthens credibility of the 
Corporation. The low-risk advantage is ''non-transferable" to 
private operator. 
9. According to the previous market analysis on the Hong Kong 
transportation market, the intensity of rivalry among 
competitors is quite low. The lack of competitors to regulate 
the operator's performance is not favorable for privatization. 
All the above factors reassure that there is no significant or pressing 
need for the Operating Railway and Airport Railway to go private in 
both short and medium term. The "Unchanged" operating regime 
will definitely facilitate smooth transition of the Corporation and its 
staff through 1997, and the successful opening of the new airport 
railway in 1 998. 
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MTRC New Extensions 
The MTRC new extensions should go private. 
The huge amount of capital required to finance the construction of 
the new extensions cannot be sustained by the Operating Railway 
and the future Lantau and Airport Railway revenues. 
Assuming that no or minimal equity will be injected by the future 
SAR government, the take-up of these new financial burdens will 




The following table summarizes the above situational analyses of 
AA and MTRC. 
Attributes Airport Authority - ~ MTRC - MTRC-
New airport Operating Railway new extensions 
and Lantau and (e.g. Tseung Kwan 
Airport Railway 0 ’ Kennedy Town 
Extension, etc.) 
Current Owner Hong Kong Hong Kong Fi7a 
Government Government 
(100%) (100%) 
Organization 6 years Operating Railway~~n?a 
History - 17years 
LAR - 4 Years 
Corporate Functional, Functional, Unknown 
Structure Highly Centralized Centralized 
Market compet i t ion~~Hi^ Low (locally) Low (locally) 
Operating Unknown H1gh Unknown 
Performance 
Potential for Substantial Marginal Moderate 
Efficiency Gain 
Profitability R]^Fi High Moderate 
Funding Low Low n/a 
Requirement - - self sustainable - self sustainable 
Short Term 
Funding H ^ h Moderate H ^ h 
Requirement - (HK$52 billion) (For debt servicing (> HK$3Q bitljon) 
Long Term only) Unlikely to receive 
equity injection 
from government 
Perceived Social Little Moderate Moderate 
Controversy if 
Privatized 
Political Risk Low Low High 
Recommend to Yes No Yes 
go private ？ (Public listing) (JV/BOT) 
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In essence, AA is a very ideal candidate for full privatization through 
public listing because of keen market competition, substantial 
potential efficiency gain, high profitability of the business, high long-
term funding requirement, low social controversy and low political 
risks. 
The planned MTRC new extensions also deserve some lesser degree 
of privatization. The main reasons being the need for huge amount 
of capital required for construction and the political uncertainty 
ahead for new projects. They are candidates for pursuing 
privatization in form of Build, Operate and Transfer. 
The Operating Railway and the Lantau and Airport Railway, on the 
other hand, face little market competition. The Operating Railway 
has been operating profitably for 17 years with excellent customer 
service and outstanding operational performance. Demand for new 
capital is low. The advantages of retaining the existing operation 
format definitely outweigh the need for privatization. 
Recommendations on how the organizations can pursue their long-






As illustrated by the BR case, privatization should not be pursued in 
a rush. It is also unlikely that privatization of AA will be a high-
priority item shortly after the handover. 
A complete management reform which embraces the following will 
facilitate improvement of performance in the short-run:-
• redefinition and re-position of the role of the Board, the role of 
each department and the relation among various departments; 
• a comprehensive procedural review to streamline existing work 
flows; 
• empowerment of line mangers; 
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• establishment of performance standards; 
• an objective review of the reward and appraisal system (for 
example by appointing third party experts); 
• communication of the result and new remuneration structure to 
all staff. 
Long-term 
In the long run, full privatization through public listing is favorable as 
it will enhance a change in corporate culture. 
To reduce speculation, uncertainty, anxiety, possible resistance and 
boost demand, the following are recommended:-
1 • The goal, purpose and scope of privatization must be clearly 
stated. (For example, airport security may be retained under 
government control.) 
2. Employees must be well-informed and be prepared 
psychologically for a change. While a high turnover may be 
harmful to smooth transition, firing unproductive or redundant 
employees could be an effective tool. (The Japan National 
Railways, for example, sacked 65,000 staff out of 270,000 in 
December 1986 and all 7 railway companies showed profit 
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since Corporation.)"^ Appointment of an independent arbitrator 
is recommended to review and benchmark the contribution of 
each employee against his compensation. The outcome could 
be either a promotion, a downgrade, a freeze or a sack. The 
hack, if necessary, should be open, fair and one-off. Appeal 
channel should be established. All remaining employees must 
be assured that there will be no more job-cut in, say, 3 years, 
and be offered incentives such as Employee Share Ownership 
Scheme. Regular staff briefing and enquiry channels are also 
essential. 
3. Airlines should be involved early in the preparatory stage. Their 
opinions must be taken into consideration. Control mechanism 
on airport charges should be compromised and agreed 
beforehand. 
4. A task force should be set up to devise detailed and realistic 
implementation plan, which should include the selection and 
appointment of a new top management. Once announced, 
strict adherence to the timetable is a must. 
11 3 
"Privatization : What Went Wrong," Asian Business. August, 1990, pp. 32 - 39. 
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5. Aggressive marketing is required. The public, especially 
potential investors, must be well aware of the opportunity well 
in advance so that they can provide useful inputs at early stage 
and conduct thorough evaluation. Detailed statistics regarding 
the existing operation of the airport must be given. 
6. Professionals such as investment bankers should also be 
involved to offer expert advice on financing. 
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The Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
Short-Term 
It has been concluded that there is no short-term need for the MTRC 
Operating Railway and the Lantau and Airport Railway to go private 
if the existing favourable financial position, operating conditions and 
political stability persist. 
Long-Term 
The most suitable modes for private financing for the new 
extensions such as Tseung Kwan 0, Kennedy , East Kowloon Line 
and other new extensions in the long run, are Joint Venture and 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). 
A joint venture ownership arrangement between Government and 
private sector is a more suitable option for rail extension projects. It 
is because the projects are normally large scale, socially viable but 
not completely financial viable, and the involvement of Government 
is therefore indispensable. 
143 
Besides, in order to attract more investors such as the property 
developers to invest in the projects, the grant of associated property 
development rights should be incorporated in the joint venture 
agreement. 
To throw some lights on the way to privatization, we recommend 
the following measures be considered during the planning and 
implementation stages of new extension projects privatization:-
1 • The goal, purpose and scope of privatization must be clearly 
stated and agreed with the future SAR Government. (For 
example, the decision to form joint venture or enter BOT 
arrangement and term of concession should be decided) 
2. Instead of pursuing staff cut, privatization of new extensions 
should bring about opportunities for the existing railway to 
transfer the well trained and experienced staff to take up new 
challenges. However, the transition should be open, fair and 
one-off. The new private operator organization should consider 
offering incentives such as Employee Share Ownership Scheme 
to motivate staff to join the new organization with independent 
account. The provident scheme and year of service of the staff 
should also be transferred to offer a fair transition. 
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3. A task force with the assistance from financing consultant, 
financial institutions and banks should be instituted to devise 
detail and realistic implementation plan for new extension 
financing. The terms of reference should cover the study of 
project risks, return and viability in both financial and social 
terms. 
4. According to the recommendations from the Wardley Capital 
Limited,ii4 Heavy Rail Transport is rated as the most difficult 
transport projects to be privately financed thereby requiring 
most government support to raise private finance. This is due 
to the huge capital required, long payback period and high 
social costs inherited in such large scale projects. (See 
Appendix 13 for the full list of private finance difficulties for 
different transport projects.) 
Furthermore, other railways' lessons reveal that entirely 
privatized operation without government subsidy or 
involvement especially large scale project will unlikely be 
successful, for example, the Channel Tunnel Project. (See 
Appendix 8) 
” 4 Kevin D. Files, "Financing Joint Ventures," Transdelta Conference 1 995. p.45-49. 
145 
Therefore, it is highly recommended that "Joint Venture" with 
private sector and co-financed by the Government should 
always be the first choice for railway privatization unless the 
project is of small scale and has little social implications. 
5. Finally, the extent of government support in the BOT or Joint 
Venture arrangement must be formalized. The Corporation 
should try every effort to clarify with the Government her roles 
in planning and implementation of such privatization exercise in 
order to attract more private investors. The essential roles of 
the Government should include but not limited to the 
f o l l o w i n g : - i i 5 
1 1 K 
Kevin D. Files, "Financing Joint Ventures," Transdelta Conference 1995. p.45-49. 
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Planning Level 
• plan the overall transport infrastructure e.g. develop and 
update Railway Development Strategy to ensure no direct 
competition and to align urban planning with infrastructural 
planning; 
• use genuine competition and tendering procedure to select 
investors; 
• realize that privatization has obligations and social costs on 
Government as well as benefits; 
• support the development of capital and bond markets to 
facilitate fund raising. 
Project Level 
• allow sufficiently long franchise or concession periods 
(preferably 30 years for major transport projects); 
• restrict future competition for franchise projects; 
• foster a stable economic environment and provide proper 
protections and guarantees for franchises against political 
risk; 
• allow sensible and flexible fare adjustment arrangements; 
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• be prepared to defend its currency to safeguard foreign 
investors against macro-economic risks (e.g. foreign 
exchange rate risk); 
• assist in the acquisition of land and resettlement; 
• ensure that the tender process is open and fair and eliminate 
fraud in the tendering and award procedures; 
• responsible for liabilities and remedial costs for past 
environmental damage. 
Contingency Plan 
We conclude that privatization is not a short-term or long-term goal 
for the MTRC Operating Railway and Airport Railway. However, due 
to the uncertainties after 1 997, we would like to identify possible 
threats that will adversely affect the profitability and autonomy of 
the Corporation. Some recommendations on how the Corporation 
can cope with and react to these contingencies in the future are 
given. 
Although highly unlikely, we anticipate that the worst scenario 
would be if the Chinese Officials override their commitment on 
"Unchanged format of operation" by other decisions, like any of the 
following:-
148 
• SAR Government wish to reduce the debt level of the 
Corporation by selling part of its assets to private operators so 
that it can begin to receive dividends from the Corporation. 
• SAR Government regard the existing operation of the 
Corporation as too costly and inefficient, especially the high 
internal staff cost. 
• SAR Government task the Corporation to take up additional 
extension development like the Kennedy Town Extension, 
South Island Line, East Kowloon Line, etc. without injecting 
equity. The Corporation has to raise capital on its own from 
the public market. 
Under these circumstances, the Corporation might need to re-
evaluate the privatization issue even for the Operating Railway and 
the Lantau and Airport Railway in order to sustain the operation. 
The four possible strategies that can be considered are highlighted 
as follows:-
• Franchise the operation of parts of its businesses like estate 
management and commercial operation to reduce the 
overhead and utilize commercially available expertise locally. 
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This is a simple form of privatization that can cut down the 
overhead cost, but could not bring about significant benefits 
to its railway operation. 
• Separate property, infrastructure, rolling stock and 
maintenance facilities assets, etc. into entities for sale. 
Franchise the three operating lines to private operators, 
analogous to franchising the operation of different routes in 
the case of British Rail and France Public Transport. However, 
this should only be taken as the last resort as it will have 
enormous impacts to the operating regime of the Corporation 
and its credibility. 
• Sell out the whole MTRC as a state-owned enterprise to a 
single investor . This scheme is not feasible due to the huge 
capital involved and the loss of control by the Government. 
The assets of MTRC was HK$34 billion as at 1994 and will 
roll up to over HK$70 billion after the opening of the Lantau 
and Airport Railway. It is not easy to find competent buyer 
that can take up such a HK$70 billion Corporation, without 
Government's participation and subsidization guarantee. 
• Arrange public listing of part of the Government's shares and 
partly privatize the Corporation. This option is only feasible if 
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the Corporation can continue achieving reasonable operating 
profits for three consecutive years after the opening of the 
Lantau and Airport Railway. 
In all of the above cases, careful planning of staff re-deployment 
and redundancy compensation is necessary. The new private 
operator should consider offering competitive remuneration 
packages to the MTRC employee to motivate staff to join the new 
organization. For example, the provident scheme should be 
transferred to and the year of service of the staff should be 
recognized by the new company. 
In addition, an autonomous fare policy must be instituted and 
safeguarded in the agreement to attract private investors, and to 
maintain the creditability of the Corporation. The existing profit 
control scheme established for public utilities based on return on 
asset can be referenced. 
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Last but not least, railway privatization is a new subject to Hong 
Kong. In view of the technical difficulties mentioned above and the 
adverse consequences of "inappropriate" privatization, the whole 
issue including possible pitfalls and impacts to the passenger, staff, 
Government, public and other stakeholders must be examined 
thoroughly. In addition, owing to the direct implication of 
privatization on the future SAR Government's roles and obligations, 
the issue must involve Central Chinese Government's support and 
participation in order to be successful. 




RECENT AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION CASES 
Country Airport Scope of Privatization 
USA New York For the first time, foreign-flag carriers (Air France, 
Kennedy Japan Airlines, Korean Air and Lufthansa), 
International through a limited partnership, were granted the 
right to exclusively develop, finance, design, 
construct and operate a new passenger terminal 
in the US in September 1995 .^ 
USA Kennedy & Private firms were invited to design, build and 
Newark manage air cargo facilities in September 1 995 
a 
USA Pittsburgh BAA was granted a 15-year contract to 
develop and manage all retail operations at the 
terminal with effect from 26 August 1991. 
Amendments to some contract terms were 
made in 1995. Expire date of agreement and 
scope of service remained unchanged ^. 
USA Indianapolis BAA USA Holdings, the US unit of BAA plc, 
obtained a 10-year contract effective 1 
October 1995 to manage the Indianapolis 
airport system - the first time that BAA was 
given full management responsibility of all 
aspects of running an airport outside U K � • 
BAA guaranteed a minimum saving of US$30 
million over a ten-year period and receives no 
payment over costs until saving of US$1 
million has been passed to the Indianapolis 
Airport Authority (IAA) ^. Any increase in IAA's 
net income from non-aviation business will be 
passed back to reduce landing fees and 
terminal charges. Major operators such as 
United Airlines and Fedex are pleased ^ . 
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Country Airport Scope of Privatization 
USA Atlantic City Johnson Controls Inc. was selected to operate 
International the airport in a public/private partnership with 
South Jersey Transportation Authority in 
January 1996 because it offered the best 
chance of minimizing airport operating costs 
while maximizing revenue. 
Once final negotiations are complete, the 
company will be awarded a five-year operation, 
maintenance and support-services contract to 
begin on 1 April 1996 ®. 
Canada 26 major Passage of the National Airports Policy in July 
airports 1 994 requires 26 major airports to be operated 
and financially managed by Canadian airport 
authorities. 
Government maintains ownership of the 
"commercialized" airports but leases the 
facilities to airport authorities over a period 60 
years, plus an optional 20 year extension f. 
UK East Midlands Sale to National Express Group Plc (a coach 
operator) in 1994 ^. 
Since privatized, there have been various 
improvements including improved public 
transport links, new runway, taxiway light 
system, etc.. Construction for a new terminal 
commenced in September 1995. A new 
roadway system is also being developed ^. 
Decision making become faster and more 
professional. Provided the airport company 
meets budget, shareholders do not interfere in 
direct management of the airport. Non-core 
activities have been dropped. Contracting out 
reduced fixed costs. Incentive scheme, profit-
sharing scheme and employee share-purchase 
scheme was in place. Company's ability to 
compete enhanced •• 
4 
154 
Country Airport Scope of Privatization 
UK Belfast Management Employee Buy-Out. Sale to 
management and staff at US$70 million in July 
1994� • Became the second major regional UK 
airport after East Midlands to enter the private 
sector k. 
Comparing April to August 1995 with the 
same period last year, total passenger traffic 
increased 23% h. 
UK Cardiff Wales Sold to private Welsh investor TBI in March 
1995 for US$56 million '. 
UK Birmingham Seven local-government authorities agreed to 
International the sale of equity (estimated to be 40%) to 
private sector in early 1994 ^. 
Aer Rianta, an Irish airport management 
company, was selected in October 1995 for 
formal negotiations to become a strategic 
partner for future development of the airport. If 
negotiation is successful, it will take up 
substantial minority shareholding (about 40%), 
while existing owners, 7 local District Councils, 
will reduce shareholding to less than 50% ^. 
UK Coventry Plan to privatize the airport near completion by 
the end of August 1 995. Control of the airport 
will be transferred to a new joint venture 
company. 
A private operation company. Airport 
Management & Investment, will have a 51 % 
stake. The Coventry City Council will hold the 
remaining 49% share ". 
Italy (not specified) Private operators granted concession to 
manage the airports up to 40 years in 
September 1 995. Current staffing levels to be 
maintained for at least three years. 
Government will provide state aid to a 
maximum of 5 years to ensure viability of 
airports processing less than 600,000 
passengers a year °. 
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Country Airport Scope of Privatization 
Italy Naples BAA signed a non-binding letter of intent with 
the airport in early 1 996 for possible purchase 
of a controlling equity stake in the airport 
operator. 
BAA guaranteed the jobs for the 475 airport 
staff for at least 3 years ^. 
Germany Hamburg, The German Government intends to sell its 
Cologne/Bonn 26% and 30.94% stake of the airport 
companies of the two airports respectively in 
1 9 9 6 q. 
Germany Munich City of Munich, which holds a 23% stake of 
the Munich Airport company FMG signaled an 
interest in divestiture. 
The federal government, which owns a 26% 
stake, may also pull out ' . 
Austria Vienna Listed in Vienna stock exchange in 1 9 9 2 � • 
Shares were 3 times oversubscribed in Austria, 
and 5 times oversubscribed abroad. Since 
flotation, share price has increased over 50% ®. 
Australia Sydney, Plan to sell these 4 biggest airport in mid-
Melbourne, 1996. The other 19 to be sold in 1997. A 
Brisbane, proceed of about US$2 billion is anticipated \ 
Perth 
BAA has already indicated that they will bid 
with two Australian partners for one or more 
airports scheduled for privatization in 1 996 ". 
Draft legislation would cap airport charges for 
5 years and limit cross-ownership of some 
combinations of airports. Leases would run 50 
years with option to renew for 49 years ^. 
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Country Airport Scope of Privatization 
Mexico (not specified) Proposed legislation has been sent to the 
Mexican Congress to authorize private 
investment in the country's airport in 
November 1995. 50-year renewable 
concession for operation will be issued. Foreign 
investors will be limited to 49% stake. Larger 
investment may be considered on a case-by-
case basis ^ . 
Denmark Copenhagen Copenhagen Airports A/S was established as 
an independent company in September 1 990 to 
eliminate public sector borrowing constraints. 
The board of directors consist of 3 members 
directly elected by the employees, 2 
government officials and 4 elected from the 
Danish business community. 
Floated 25% of its equity in the stock 
exchange in April 1994. Offer over-subscribed 
with 80% of the shares being sold to foreign 
investors \ 
a "Construction begins on Kennedy Terminal; Cargo Development Advances," Airports, 
12 September, 1995, pp.360. 
b "Allegheny County renegotiates BAA concession agreement," World Airport Retail News. 20 
August, 1995, pp. 1,2,8. 
e "BAA USA signs management contract for Indianapolis Airports," Airports, 19 
September, 1995, pp. 371. 
d "BAA faces tough challenge, Jane's Airport Review. November, 1995, pp. 52. 
e "Johnson Controls wins Atlantic City Management Contract," Airports, 2 January, 1996, pp. 
2. 
f "Canada's New Commercial Airports Spotlight Concessions," World Airport Retail News. 5 
June, 1995, pp. 1 - 7. 
g "Private investment may be invited to secure Birmingham's future," Airport Forum. 
1/1994, pp. 14. 
h "Airports plan a private agenda," Jane's Airport Review. October, 1995, pp. 40 - 42. 
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‘ "East Midlands' move into the private sector," ACI Europe • Sources of Finance for Airport 
Development, p. 32 - 33. 
j "Public property in private hands?" Airport Support. September, 1994. pp. 23. 
k "How to sell an airport," Airports International. October, 1994, pp. 26. 
I "Funding future growth. Beg, borrow or float?" Airport Business Management & Development. 
July/August, 1995, p. 16. 
m "Birmingham teams up wi th Aer Rianta," Airports International. October, 1995. 
n "Coventry airport privatization nears , South China Morning Post. Aug. 22, 1995, p. 7. 
° "Italy confirms privatization of country 's airports," Airports. 5 September, 1995, pp. 
351. 
P "BAA to negotiate for controlling interest in Naples, Italy, Airport," Airports. 9 January, 1996, 
pp.9. 
q "German Government to sell stakes in Hamburg, Cologne/Bonn Airports," Airports. 5 
December, 1995, pp. 469. 
r "Freeing the golden goose," Airport Support. December, 1994, pp. 9. 
s "Going to market - Vienna Airport's share flotation," ACI Europe • Sources of Finance for 
Airport Development, p. 32 - 33. 
t "SeH-off strategy turns sour," South China Morning Post. Nov. 2, 1995, p. 6. 
“ B A A plc unaudited results for the six months to 30 September 1995, November. 1995. 
V "Draft Australian Privatization Law Would Cap Charges, Limit Cross-Ownership," Airports. 22 
August, 1995, pp. 331. 
w "Mexico's president proposes airport privatization bill," Airports. 21 November, 1995, 
pp. 451. 
X "Privatization by flotation at Copenhagen," ACI Europe . Sources of Finance for Airport 
Development, p. 31. 
158 
APPENDIX 2 
BOARD MEMBERS OF THE AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
Chairman 
1. Mr. Wong Po Yan 
Ex-officio 
2. Dr. Henry Townsend 
Public Officers 
3. Secretary for Works 
4. Secretary for the Treasury 
5. Director of New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office 
6. Director of Civil Aviation 
7. Secretary for Economic Services 
8. Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Non-Government Members 
9. Mr. David Gledhill 
10. Mr. Antony Leung Kam Chung 
11. Mr. Vincent Lo Hong Sui 
12. Dr. Peter Wong King Keung 
13. Mr. John Gray 
14. Mr. Lo Chung Hing 
1 5. Miss Maria Tam Wai Chu 
16. Dr. Philip Wong Yu Hong 
17. Mr. Ho Sai Chu 
Source : News. Airport Authority Hong Kong, December 1995. 
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APPENDIX 3 
SCOPE OF WORK OF PHASE 1a 
• The entire airport platform (approx. 1248 hectares) 
• infrastructure 
• rail & road surface access systems 
• Southern runway, its related taxiway system, aircraft parking aprons 
• passenger terminal complex (without NW arm) 
• support & ancillary facilities 
• aircraft support 
• government facilities 







Chek Lap Kok 
Airport BAA Denver Copenhagen Kal Tak (CLK) 
Year ended Mar. 95 Dec. 94 Dec. 94 Mar. 94 Mar. 99 
Currency unit GBP million US$ million DKK million HK$ mill ion HK$ million 
Source 1 2 3 4 5 
Revenue 1,159.0 237 .7 1,063.8 2 ,532 .7 8,405.0 
Expenditure 
Staff cost 229.5 47 .0 324.6 313 .8 862.0 
Other operating expense 437.7 77 .0 206.8 460 .4 1,095.0 
Other expenses - 0.7 - - 2 ,012.0 
Depreciation 90.3 53.0 168.5 491 .8 1,894.0 
Interest expense 35.0 34 .0 86.8 QJ. 1,005.0 
Total 792.5 21 1.8 786.7 " " " 1 , 2 6 6 . 2 6,868.0 
Profit before tax 366.5 26.0 277.1 1 ,266.5 1,537.0 
Net Asset 2,845.0 939.1 1,271.8 4 ,698 .7 36,648.0 
Passenger (million) 87.7 33 .0 14.1 25 .0 33.9 
Cargo & mail 
million tonnes 1.5 0.3 1.2 1.7 
million pounds 840.0 
No. of employee 7,796 n.a. 1,170 300 1,500 
(*) (•) 
Source 
1 BAA 1995 Report and Account 
2 Denver International Airports Annual Report 1994 
3 Copenhagen Airports A/S Annual Report 1994 
4 Report on Civil Aviat ion Hong Kong, 1993 - 1994 
5 Preliminary Information Memorandum, 




Adjusted Data Discounted I Inflated to Calendar Year 1994 in HK$ million 
Airport BAA Denver G0D6nh306A Kai Tak CLK 
Revenue 13,908.0 1,854.1 1,489.3 2 ,748.0 6,064.8 
Expenditure 
Staff cost 2 ,754 .0 367.0 454 .4 340.5 622.0 
Other operating expense 5 ,252.4 600.6 289 .6 499.5 790.1 
Other expenses - 5.8 - - 1,451.8 
Depreciation 1,083.6 413.5 235 .9 533.6 1,366.7 
Interest expense ^ 420 .0 264.8 121.5 OJ, 725.2 
Total 9 ,510.0 1,651.7 1 ,101.4 1,373.8 4,955.8 
Profit before tax 4 ,398.0 202.4 387 .9 1,374.2 1,109.1 I 
Net Asset 34 ,140 .0 7,324.9 1,780.6 5,098.1 26,444.3 | 
Passenger (million) 87.7 33.0 14.1 25.0 33.88 | 
C a r g o & M a i l ( m i " i o n k g ) 1,480.0 381.8 270.0 1,203.0 1,674.0 I 
Work Load Unit * (WLU) (million) 102.5 36.8 16.8 37.0 50.6 I 
No. of employee 7,796 n.a. 1,170 300 1,500 | 
* 1WLU = 1 passenger or 100 kg freight I 
Assumptions | 
1 GBP = HK$12 1 tonne = 1000 kg I 
1 US$ = HK$ 7.8 2.2 pound = 1 kg | 
1 Denmark Krone = HK$1.4 Inflation = 8.5% per year I 
Part C I 
Performance Indicator I 
1 Total costs per WLU (HK$) 9 3 4 5 6 6 3 7 9 8 I 
2 Operating costs per WLU (HK$) 7 8 2 6 4 4 2 3 5 7 I 
3 WLU per employee (thousand) 1 3 1 4 1 2 3 3 4 • 
4 Total revenue per employee (HK$M) 1 . 7 8 1 . 2 7 9 . 1 6 4 . 0 4 • 
5 WLU per GBP1000 net asset value 3 6 6 0 1 1 3 8 7 23 I 
6 Total Revenue per WLU 1 3 6 5 0 8 9 7 4 1 2 0 I 














































































































































































































































































































RECENT RAILWAY PRIVATIZATION AND PRIVATE FINANCING CASES 
Country Railway / Mode of Privatization and Lessons 
Y ^ 
Bangkok ^~~Bangkok "BOT" 
Transit The Bangkok Transit Systems Corporation is 
Systems a subsidiary of Tanayong Group, a Hong Kong 
Corporation listed company. It was granted a 30-year 
1994 concession to develop a 28.5-km two-line 
elevated system with 22 stations. 
Bangkok ^ Metropolitan "Joint Venture'' 
Rapid Transit After failure of the proposed privately 
Administratio financed sky metro in 1992, the government 
n agree to fund 70% of construction costs and 
1 993 MRTA was set up with a remit to construct 
an initial 20-km elevated line. In 1993, the 
city's largest property development company, 
Bangkok Land, is selected to develop the 
project with AEG Westinghouse as the 
partner. 
China - Wuhan "Private Financing'' 
Wuhan ^ Lightrail The twinning of Wuhan with Duisburg in 
/metro Germany has agreed under which Siemens 
Proposed will assist the development of proposals for a 
9.2-km light rail line. Private sector funding 
for the scheme is being sought in Hong Kong. 
A 1 6-km elevated metro is also proposed for 
construction by private-sector companies 
China ^ Zhejiang Zhejiang province has been building China's 
first railway line with investment by a Sino-
foreign joint venture. The 252-km line runs 
from Jinhua to the coastal town of Wenzhou, 
is owned by the provincial railway arm, the 
Shanghai administration bureau of the 
Ministry of Railways and Hong Kong's Lourus 
Holding - which is owned by Wenzhou-born 
academic Nan Huaijin. 
The investment is more than 2 billion yuan 
and the line will be in full operation at the end 
of next year. This railway has been planned 
since the mid 1 980s. 
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Country Railway / Mode of Privatization and Lessons 
Year 
Dartford 1995 " B O r ' 
Bridge A private sector contractor was given a 20-
Crossing ^ 25 year contract to build, maintain and 
manage the bridge and to recover all its costs 
via the toll fees. 
Dutch c DutchRail Privatization 
{NS) The rail company received Nfl 350m subsidy 
1 995 in 1995. NS is still expanding and upgrading 
its rail network. It intends to restructure or 
privatize several business units including NS 
cargo and has faced strong opposition from 
the labour union to slow down the pace of 
privatization. 
France ® Paris-Orly "Private Finance Initiative" 
Airport rapid Private financing of investments in public 
mass transit services to reduce public sector debt and tax. 
system This makes the user pay through and limits 
1 995 foreign borrowing. 
France ^ Via G.T., "Joint Venture and Privatized" 
CGEA, In 1982, the franchising of public services in 
Transdev/ France began with the law on the Orientation 
Transcet of Internal Transport (LOTI). A number of 
1 995 local authorities come together in an 
"Organizing Authority" (OA) to look after their 
own transportation needs and contract out 
their responsibilities through a private 
company. The national government does not 
make contribution to this aspect of the 
financing, but can and does subsidize specific 
infrastructure projects, not beyond a 
maximum of 20%. All the private firms must 
be listed on a register held by the State 
authorities. 
The contract must run for a set period, and 
conditions of service levels and the conditions 
for their operation and financing must be 
adhered. The responsible authority will define 
the fare policy with limitations on the extent 
of the annual fare changes. OA can choose to 
operate the system under the legal appellation 
of "Regie" or use a private organization to run 
the network; either a semi-private, Joint 
venture (20%) or a strictly private firm (70% 
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Country Railway / Mode of Privatization and Lessons 
Year 
of market). 
Japan ^ 1993 "Float on the stock exchange" 
The railway was divided into the geographical 
sections and is waiting for opportune time to 
float. 
Mexico n R ^ "Franchising" 
Planned 1997 Entire network was privatized within two 
years. Franchisees will be awarded. 
Withdrawal of worst performing services. 
New 1980s ''Commercialization under public ownership" 
Zealand ® Railway sold to an American firm in July 93. 
Job cuts from 20,000 in 1981 to 5,000 in 
1995. 
Profits replaced losses. 
Singapore SMRT "Float on the stock exchange" 
丨‘m Planned SMRT operates and maintains the 67-km 
metro under license from Mass Railway 
Transit Corporation (MRTC). The major 
shareholder of SMRT is Temasek Holdings Pte 
Ltd. The arrangement is to allow SMRT to 
operate on its own financially before its 
shares are offered for public subscription. In 
1995, total passengers were 258.9m and the 
Corporation reported an after tax profit of 
S$108.6m. 
In the White Paper "A World Class Land 
Transport System, Jan 1996 丨，The 
government is committed to investing in an 
expanded rail network to provide a 
significantly better public transport system 
which charges affordable fares, meets the 
needs of Singapore and is sustainable in the 
long run. The Government will change the 
financing terms for public transport 
operations. The operator has to be 
responsible for the operating costs which 
covers depreciation of existing assets. The 
rest of the replacement cost will be borne by 
the government. The amount of government's 
injection will depend on the rate of asset 
inflation. This arrangement has distinctive 
advantages of suppressing fare increase and 
render more rail projects viable. 
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Country Railway / Mode of Privatization and Lessons 
Year 
Sweden ^ 1 988 Only rural services were opened to 
competition. Mainline services remain a 
monopoly of the state rail company. 
No. of employees was trimmed from 29,000 
in 1987 to 18,000. Costs have fallen by 
30%. 
Swiss K Federal Privatization and separation of infrastructure 
Railways SBB were ruled out 
1 995 SBB is receiving Sfr2.5bn subsidy from the 
government every year for infrastructure 
development and equipment procurement and 
improvement. In October 1995, the president 
of announced that the privatization of SBB 
and separation of infrastructure were not 
possible due to the following reasons:-
i) the railways are already exposed to intense 
competition from other modes; 
ii) efficient operations on a railway carrying 
dense inter-city, local and freight traffic on 
same tracks can only be assured if the 
production planning, scheduling and 
infrastructural management are carried out by 
an organization that is close to the operation; 
iii) close inter-dependence between vehicle 
and infrastructure has never been 
successfully implemented; 
iv) Swiss Federal Railway is already the most 
productive in Europe. Compared with 
Deutschen Bahn, they produce 25% more 
train km and 41 % more passenger-km and 
tonne-km per staff; 
v) asset productivity can be boosted by job 
cut without need of privatization. 
United BR & SNCF "Privatization with no Government subsidy" 
Kingdom Opened 1 994 The Eurotunnel was floated in 1987 and 
& France shares issued amounted to 2.1 billion pounds. 
Channel The Eurotunnel is default on 8 billion pounds 
Tunnel ‘ of loans. It proves that 100% private finance 
for very big projects is impossible. 
Government has to be involved. It underlies 
the vital need for stability and assured legal 
framework. 
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Country Railway / Mode of Privatization and Lessons 
Y ^ 
United Heathrow "Joint Venture" 
Kingdom ^ Express Rail 70% British Airports Authority and 30% 
link British Railways Board Joint Venture was 
1994 formed between government and private 
sector. The existing infrastructure of 
government became stakes in the projects. 
United London "Private Finance Initiative" 
Kingdom ^ Underground UK Government adopted Private Finance 
Limited Initiative to renew the entire Northern Line 
1 994 fleet of trains. A leasing and maintenance 
contract for a fleet of 106 new trains was 
announced under the government's private 
finance initiative at the end of 1 995. GEC 
Alsthom was awarded the contract to supply 
Metro equipment and finance the 
construction. 
United British Privatizing with selling of assets and 
Kingdom Railway Franchising. 
a' c 1994-1 996 Since April 1994, the BR and London 
suburban rails have been operated by 25 and 
10 regional management known as Train 
Operating Companies (TOC). They operate as 
shadow franchises prior to being offered to 
the private sector on a concessionaire basis. 
They run over track owned by the 
infrastructure authority Railtrack and with 
rollingstock leased from three Rolling Stock 
Leasing Companies. 
(Refer to Chapter 3 Case Study for more 
details) 
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a Janes World Railways. 1995-1996. (Newyork:Franklin Watts), 
b "Railways behind time on investment. South China Morning Post. 11 April 1996. 
c "The Private Finance Initiative," Rail Bulletin. Janurary, 1996, pp.19-20 
d "Dutch Privatization facing strong opposition," Rail Bulletin, December, 1995. pp. 3 
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1991, pp. 18 - 37. 
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APPENDIX 11 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY CORPORATION 
BOARD 
Chairman 
1. Jack. C.K.So Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive since 1 April 1995 
Public Officers 
2. H.H.T.Barma Secretary for Transport, Hong Kong 
G o v 6 m m 6 n t 
3. K.C.Kwong Secretary for the Treasury, Hong Kong 
Government (Apr 95) 
Non-Government Members 
4. Alexander Au Siu Kee Director, Heng Seng Bank Ltd. 
5. Edward Chen Kwan Yiu Professor and Director, Centre of Asian 
Studies at the University of Hong Kong. 
Member of the Executive Council. 
6. D.W.Gairns Formerly Senior Partner with KPMG Peat 
Marwick, Hong Kong. 
7. D.A.GIedhill Chairman, Sports Development Board. 
8. Ho Sai Chu Director, Fook Lee Holdings Ltd. 
9. Ho Sing Tin Managing Director, Wong Tung & 
Partners Ltd, Member of the Legislative 
Council. 
10. C.hLLo Deputy General Manager of the Bank of 
China. 
Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994 , p. 2. 
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TOP LEVEL ORGANIZATION CHART OF MTRC 
Chairman 
Finance Legal Operations Human Property Marketing Project 
Director Director Director Resources Director & Planning Director 
& Director Director 
Secretary 




Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994. p. 2. 
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PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKING - FIVE METRO SYSTEMS 
COMPANY PROFILE 
MTRC BVG LUL NYCTA RATP 一 
City Hong Kong Berlin London New York Paris 
Corporation Mass Berliner London New York Regie 
Transit Verkehrs Undergro city Autonome 
Railway - Betriebe und Transport des 
Corporation Limited Authority Transports 
Parisiens 
No. of 5343 a 7527 20463 30245 20829 
employee 
Initial Route 1979 1902 1863 1904 1900 
opened on 
Service 2-2.5 min 3 min Peak in 1 min 35s 
(peak) (peak) central to 3 min 
3-5 min 5-10 min area 2.5 50s 
(non-peak) (off peak) min minimum 
Fare Structure Zonal Rat Zonal Rat Rat 
Source: Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Engineering Insight. Nov., 95. 
a MTRC staff size for the existing railway only, LAR and Estate staff excluded. 
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PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKING - FIVE METRO SYSTEMS 
ROUTE DATA 
MTRC BVG LUL NYCTA RATP 
Routelength 43.2 134 394 398 201.4 
Rolling Stock (no. of 709 1636 4582 5866 3481 
rail cars) 
1 ^ . of stations 38 158 271 ~ ^ 9 370 
Government subsidy Not Required Required Required Required 
required 
Operating costs (1993 ) financed by: 
T ^ e s | 1 0 Q % " | 3 3 % [ 1 1 1 % " ' M 6 5 . 6 % | 3 6 . 4 % ~ 
Commercial Sources extra 10% f^7i 1.2% 19.2%~~ 
revenues 
State and local ^ 57% (1%" "^ i ^ 18.9% 44.4% ° 
government subsidies Federal) 
Taxy levy n ^ n ^ n ^ 23.4% 
Sources: Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Engineering Insight. Nov., 95. 
Janes World Railways. 1995-1996, (Newyork : Franklin Watts), 
p .36,187,244,287. 
a Among the 5 metros, only MTRC and LUL covered total costs by passenger fares without 
any subsidy. 
b Compensation for 'social fares' reductions, employers, national and local government, 
e Before depreciation and renewal. 
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PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKING - FIVE METRO SYSTEMS 
Criterion M T R C “ 4 Metros 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 丨 _ _ _ _ _ 
Service Quality 99.71 94.73% 
- % of passenger journeys on time % 
Efficiency 76 44.2 
- total passenger journeys per annum per staff hour 
FinancialPerformance 3.53 1.35 
-Unit revenue per unit operating cost in terms of each 
passenger journey 
Asset Utilization 42.5%~"24.5% 
-Passenger kilometer per capacity kilometer 
Reliability ^ 7 ^ 
-Car Operating Hours between total incidents 
Source: Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Engineering Insight, Nov., 95. 








I 1 • Prudent Commercial 
i • J Principle 丨 j 
'-im^mmpamBamm^ \ 3!1奎乗客射下列兩項的 | 
+ :接受程度 I 
, •車賨加《連議 1 
地磁公司軍賨政策 •服務糖有所通之程度 I 
: • 用 者 自 付 原 則 r PassengerSurveyon 
MTRC Fare Policy Public Acceptability of 
.User-Pay Principle • proposed Fare Increase 
“ r~rv—rrr ., •., ； • Valu6 fof Money Service 
交通諮满委員會： -.“-一^^. . � 
TransportAdvisory ” , * ‘ ..-- , � “ ‘ 2 — - w . ^ y t < i 
Committee : 初《車費加《檢討 考 ]^  
:j ; PreliminaryAnnualFare j 按以下三«分析車費 
»*»»xi^.-.^. t-t-- i Review 1 的《爭力 : i 
i "j • 现 務 « 素 
立法局交通 j , « ^ ^ 4 : 、 〜 . 一 . 。 •其他交通工具的收費 
事務委員會 ：1 I 丨•市場佔有率 
LegCo 車賛加«建竈 1 ，FareCompetr t iveness � 
Transport Panei H Annual Fare Increase i 丨 withregardto 
. y j ^ , •, Proposal J ； • ServiceQuality ‘ 
狐 _ ^ 丄 - 脚 』 i ^ ： • FaresofOther 
‘ ： ^^力义上働“裁”』 i Transport Modes ‘ 
:] ； ^ • Market Share 
邐 输 科 參 考 文 件 2 ； 丨 ‘ 111_丨_國圔1iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
TransportBranch | ~ ~ i 地 雄 公 司 董 辜 局 決 策 j 
lnformationPaper i p > | MTRC BoardDecision j j 理， | 
j)jrtagHftf*tffw>f^ "^ f^fFml I • 理演增畏 
HegHieggBB55gEsil i •通貨膨賊 
+ •講買力 
1^55StS4)lS ‘ � E c o n o m y 
行政面 [ 」 有«車費加權 • Economic Growth 
ExCo |- lnformTAC&LegCo > • mf]atlon 
i ： on Fare Increase • purchasing Power 
^ — y a — i ^-^mmmmmmimmm^ 
直佈車費加權 財務 
Announce Fare •收益 
Increase •資本闻支 
- m m ^ m m m m m J L •理營開支 
+ Financial 
• Revenue 
貢施 • CapitalExpendfture 
• * 删 貼 咖 • operatingCo8t 
«貢改變 L ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 




n m m m m m m m m J i 




RECENT FARE ADJUSTMENT OF MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY 
地纖車資壜 «較通》抵 
MTR Fare increase Less Than Inflation 
8 0 0 . ff :naeA 1980 -. 100) 
番港工資指數 
700 - ^^^^14.0% y 
HK Payroll lndice / 
(Avg. 14.0%p.a.) / 
600 一 / 
/ 
500 - / 
y /甲頻消費物價指數 
‘ y/ 二二基王8.6% 
400 - y ^ Consumer 
y ^ Price Index A 
/ (Avg. d.6%p.a.) 
300 — y / ^ . ^ 
200 ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ _«^ ^：：：：^^ ^^ ^^ 5^_車資 
^ ^ -^^^7.3% 
^ ^ ; ; ^ ^ ^ : : = L - ^ " " MTR Average Fare 
100 _ ^ < ^ (Ag. 7.8% p.a.) 
30 81 82 83 84 85 86 37 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
地雄車費一物有所僅 
MTR Fares 一 Value for Money 
各 公 共 交 通 工 具 收 資 是 否 物 有 所 值 的 公 眾 意 向 調 查 
Publ_c Attrtude Towards Various Public Transport Fares ！ 
in Terms of Value for Money 
<w_?.* #f^4-7.;.- - "v " : i i . - :3 ！ 
Soorc，.. SRH Sunvy. Decemoer 1995 
I 
fH^.iT'I^t7;.S — 二 - -\-r ,0 -'»'i . ！ ^ i 8 
VaJtM for Money Rank,ng (10 = Best ana 1 = Poor) ~ .丨 
8 ， 
I 
6 - ^m ~ ~ | —— 
1� I i _ J i i [i 丨 
1 . „MM1 
••: T ^ 九 廣 进 路 天 星 小 蝓 九 《 巴 士 香 港 小 《 中 《 巴 ± 的士 
： 了�抓 圓 XCR StarFerry KM8 HYF CMB T^ 
M a ' r c h ' U ^ r Trans^ Railway Corporation. MTRC'. Fare D e t _ i _ o n A i ^ g p ^ . 7 
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RECENT FARE ADJUSTMENT OF MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY 
地繊車费較本地及海外其他運輪系统僅惠 
MTR Fares Compared Favourably 
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Average fares for aduKs are adjusted on a comparable basis as at September 1993 




一 九 八 零 至 一 九 九 五 年 平 均 每 年 收 費 加 幅 
Annual Average Fare Increase, 1980-1995 
% 
12 11.9% 11.9% 
J 10.7% 
10 J r ~ ~ ~ 9.9% 9.7% 
- 8.5% 
8 - r ^ 7 ^ 
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CUSTOMER SERVICE TARGETS OF MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY 
COPORATION 
^ " ^ 1 只 《 ^ 3 5 1 % ^ 麥 ^ ^ 出 疗 、 二 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ( ^ « ^ ^ 校 翁 隨 辩 ^ ^ 可 供 使 _ _ 叙 
Train Re l iab i l i ty列車服務可》程度 
O u r train reliability is m e a s u r e d bv ihe average n u m b e r o f p a s s e n < ^ ~ 65o ‘ 
successfullv ca r r i ed fo r each passenger delaved bv 5 m i n u t e s o r more . M M 625 — 
P e r f o r m a n c e in 1994 was idTected bv the convers ion o f t l i c ro l l ing ^^ ® ^ H 500 ^ H ^ 
stock fleet to an electronic based motor coniroI svstern and 3 % ~ ~ " I ^ F ^ g ^ ' 
c x c e p t i o n a l ! v wct w e a i h e r d u r i n g Mav a n d j u n e . ' ^ B “ | B | |^： 
列主服^^ »厂靠程度是比权乘客主時抵涉的次农與乘客受延了吳过五分线或以上的'^ _^_^ jj|B fl| 墜 
次农〕一九九四王 .由於所有列卓均需更換電子换控士引系统及五、六E ] ^^-.¾- m ^ mM K ~ 
湖.:《的、氣.足年的^^見因而受到7?)茶： B H m 驚 
92 93 94 
-gg^HQ^rT^rain Performance (TWL)繁忙時間列車表現（圣灣錢） 
Thc (:(,rporati(m sets targets for die mmiber of t ra in journevs in peak l00 ^ ^ 
times and thcn measures ihe [Jiopori ion of times tht.se tart^eLs have S H ^ ^ 
!)r(.n ;ichit'ved. Perforinancc in I'.)VM ua.s afTected bv intensive servict. ‘劝 i B P ^ ' 
n|^HH ^&^*jr 
f()r improved lu-ad\va\s which n iac lc�he ta i ^ r i more di f f icul t to achieve ^ W R ^ & 麵。 
an(i i l icre wrrc inc;rc incidents in pt-ak hours. W B L ^ ^ m -^-'^ 
公司 ^ --緊••"=時.乂 •:•、：車报终 i;i..t 指 ^  . .¾ /¾ t t f 千':亍車进次过到預期.:§ r£ 40 90% ^ 90% W^ 90% !9% | 
的比本：主^^. A>i： tttm t §資4以^ 'f更妖'二: 2- i;£ :i:.以致所制定的指,票史 l o ^ ¾ ~ ~ H g fe^ I 
拉^：到此》卜.主内计v忙時vl出現的¾jt亦•l5 W B i ^ 1 ^ j 
92 93 94 i 
t 
Ticket Reliability車票耐用程度 
Ticket rdi ; ibi l i tv is measured bv the average nunibcr of successtul 
journe\.s tor a customer before a Common Stored Value Ticket net*ds 肩 g » 誦 
exchang ing . With ihe in t roduc t ion of Hi-C iickeus in 1993, ticket ^ W ~ ^ ¾ ^ ^ 
re l iab i I i t v h a s i m p r o v e d . In 1994. p r o b l e m s w i th phvs ica l lv d a m a g e d M B 數‘:、 
t icket5 were i d e n t i f i e d a n d a p r o g r a m m e is now m p lace to p r o m o t e '^ ®® 麵 ^ H B ^ 
proper custodv of" tickeLs bv passengers. J ^ | ^ 霧：-. 
車票耐用n .t是指灰客成功ft用iii iA主票次教與s \ it而需要更換車票次fi g _ I B B _:'.. 
之比較。一九九三主-:^1出強磁朿票丨’1.止票的耐用程复大<提高。一九九四革再 600 750 gH fflH 變 : 
尋出一些令主票受損的原因.公司現正進行一項1十劃.協助乘客正確保-;(車票 ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 ^ ^ ~ ~ 
£5031310丨八乂01135山17自動電梯可供使用程度 
Escalator availabilicy is impor t an t for g o o d cus tomer service. T h e 120 一 
p e r f o r m a n c e is i n d i c a t e d bv the average n u m b e r o f successful j ou rnevs - _ H H M B B I 
w i t h escalators b e i n g avai lable f o r one occasion n o t w o r k i n g . ^ _ ^ ^ H B 肪 J g 
自動贪评可供 i t ^程度是良好 <肖客服件的重要一 ？聚.此表現可從乘客在車权.2 ~72 ^H~~ | ^ g B ^ 
成功丨吏/T]自動“定丨弟的平 u^t字丨罕知 ^ H _ _ _ ^ H _ _ _ J K 
lJJzM 
92 93 94 
I'"Xri Wff • X(tti.tl IV-M(.f in.iii( r *WAfV 
Source ： Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1994. p. 52. 
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Customer Service Targets and Performance - RaUway Operation 鐵路邐作之願客激務指標與表現 丨 
_ , _ „ , a ^ 从 I—I ^ ^ Major Areas chat Need Improvement as Perceived Customers' F e e d b a c k 顯吝的回徵 by customera *客《為爾作改驀的主要項目 
T h e C o r p o r a t i o n r e g u l a r l y seeks f e e d b a c k o n c u s t o m e r s ' n e e d s a n d 10 .\>«/ for i,npr,wnru^ it ,m <i /"�"""smV 以卜计>,1分的：^要改薄并分& 
a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d o u r se rv i ce s so as to i d e n t i f y a r e a s f o r i m p r o v e m e n t . 
9 
D u r i n g 1994, t h r o u g h o u r c u s t o m e r l ia ison c h a n n e l s , we h a v e '':; 钃'^ ^ 
r e c e i v e d 1,450 p a s s e n g e r s u g g e s t i o n s a n d s p o k e n to o v e r "g ~ 
5 5 0 p a s s e n g e r s in 48 P a s s e n g e r Liaison M e e t i n g s h e l d in t h e form o f 
7 
C o f f e e E v e n i n g s . 顯 wgm 
公司定期收集顧客對我 f r 1所提供的服济的需求和感受的回请0在一九九四年 “^  麗 ffl • 
内.公司透遇储客諮询渠道.收到一千四百五十份乘客建議.更舉辦四十八次 B L _ _ B L _ J B L _ _ J H _ 
乘客骑络會.以黃昏茶鼓形式先凌與超過五百五十名乘客封話。 ^;e Uje,^ f^  fotr^rDeUys^TrnW^ 
廣運《度 列車3&»資料 
Fare D e t e r m i n a t i o n S t r a t e g y 霞定車11策田各 increase in MTR Average Fare 地下蠼》平均車資《» 
Since c o m m e n c e m e n t o f opera t ion in Oc tober 1979, ou r average 750 /,"/«•«» HKPavroii index iAv .^ i4.i^ p.a.i 
a n n u a l f a r e i n c r e a s e h a s b e e n in l ine with i n f l a t i o n ( C o n s u m e r P r i ce * * ^^^*'“麟….”.'/ 
600 , 
I n d e x A) a n d is b e l o w t h e ave rage a n n u a l payro l l i n c r e a s e 
in Hong Kong. 450 Consmncr Price Index A (.V^ :8.ti% p.a.) 
公司在一九七九年十月通卓以來.每年的平均車费增幅都跟随通帳 _ " _ ( 剛 - 一 
300 Z. -— 
(即〒類消资物丨贫栺數）及低於衣港每年的平均工資增幅。 . --一_^<<-— 
^ ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ . . 
150 MTRAverage Fare (Av^ . 7.8% p.a.) 
地卜-鲤路_?均《»丨‘尹均«年7.8»/,> 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 | 
Commitments on Service Improvement & Equipment Replacement 
Assets Improvement Sc Replacement i 
改善服務及更換設備的承諾 «的改善及更， ‘ 
T h e C o q j o r a t i o n plans improvements in its service to passengers 1750 <nHK5 Miiiwn ffMmjt ！ 
with cap i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e p r o g r a m m e s o n i m p r o v e m e n t s i n c l u d i n g ^ -
add i t iona l trains, new t ra in cont ro l and s ignal l ing systems, coo l i ng ^ H | 
chi l lers upgrade, better te lecommunicat ion coverage, and stat ion 1050 j^HH ^ H j 
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~^ “^  n ~~~ W^ ~ ~ ^ ~" W h 
“ " “ “ 丨 ” • i 鼈 ‘ ''^^ 
90 91 92 93 94 :| 
Source : Mass Transit Railway Corporation, Annual Reoort 1994. p. 53. 
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